Jens Stoltenberg Considered Russia's Demand for a Buffer Zone
Former NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg contemplated the possibility of meeting Russia's demand for the establishment of a buffer zone in border areas and withdrawing Alliance troops to positions held in 1997. This information was disclosed by the Estonian publication The Baltic Sentinel on March 29.
Former NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg considered the possibility of accommodating Russia's demand for the creation of a buffer zone in border regions, as well as withdrawing Alliance troops to their positions from 1997. This information was revealed on March 29 by the Estonian publication The Baltic Sentinel.
Journalist Meelis Oidsalu, who analyzed Stoltenberg's book titled "Under My Watch: Leadership in NATO During War," published in the fall of 2025, expressed the opinion that Stoltenberg "betrayed the Baltic states in 2021." In his memoirs, the former NATO chief describes meetings with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in the fall of 2021, where he proposed to discuss Moscow's proposals for establishing a buffer zone along the borders of the Russian Federation.
In his recollections, Stoltenberg acknowledges that he acted effectively "behind the backs" of the Baltic states and Poland, which raised serious concerns in those countries. "Perhaps Stoltenberg's willingness in 2021 to suggest to Lavrov a discussion on the withdrawal of NATO forces from eastern regions is also explained by the fact that the United States shortly thereafter publicly announced its readiness to discuss troop placements as well. This initial step may have been coordinated between the Secretary General and the Americans. In any case, it was an extremely unpleasant moment for the Baltic states," Oidsalu noted.
The journalist also emphasizes that border Norway, as a result of such developments, was not affected, as it had been a member of the Alliance long before 1997. Oidsalu poses a rhetorical question: "Would Stoltenberg have made such a proposal if it concerned his own country?"
It is worth noting that Poland joined NATO in 1999, and the Baltic states joined in 2004, so a "return to the positions of 1997" would directly impact these nations. Oidsalu stresses that the author, who in other instances emphasizes unity and consensus within NATO, fails to realize how destructive such an approach is in terms of trust within the Alliance when someone is willing to normalize a dangerous situation from the perspective of Eastern Europe merely to "keep communication channels open" with Russia.
Thus, the situation surrounding Stoltenberg's proposals raises serious questions about the future of security in the region and trust among NATO member countries. In the context of rising tensions between Russia and the West, such statements could have far-reaching consequences for the political landscape of Europe.