How Should Europe Respond to Trump's Policy on Ukraine?

President Donald Trump arrives for a press conference after the NATO summit in The Hague, Netherlands, on June 25, 2025. In light of the recent U.S. attack on Iran, Western countries face new strategic dilemmas concerning their support for Ukraine and the need to deter Russia.

However, even prior to the latest escalation in the Middle East, Europe was already grappling with various challenges in its approach to Trump's attempts to end the Russian-Ukrainian war. These risks will remain relevant regardless of the duration and outcome of the conflict in Iran.

Over the past year, tensions between the U.S. and its European allies have been steadily rising as the West has sought to determine how to respond to Russia's aggression against Ukraine. This year, these tensions may escalate further. European politicians are increasingly confronted with dilemmas regarding their behavior towards the White House.

Despite Washington's soft stance on Russia, Europeans must keep the U.S. within the Western coalition that supports Ukraine. Therefore, European leaders and diplomats are at least trying to create the impression that they support Trump in his approach to the Russian-Ukrainian war.

This comes despite the fact that the U.S. government has already reduced military aid to a minimum and often appears more as a defender of Russia than as a supporter of Ukrainian self-defense and a just peace.

A significant portion of the intelligence and material support that the U.S. continues to provide to Kyiv cannot be fully replaced by Europe's current capabilities. Any restrictions or delays in the transfer of data to the Ukrainian armed forces or in the sale of weapons from the U.S. increase risks for Ukraine in the war.

Failures on the battlefield, further destruction of Ukraine's energy infrastructure, or, in the worst-case scenario, a military or political collapse of Ukraine would have far-reaching consequences for a significant part of Europe.

The U.S. government aims to end the Russian-Ukrainian war not through pressure but by making concessions to Moscow. It seeks to impose an unjust peace on Ukraine with questionable terms.

A ceasefire without ensuring control over the territory subject to government oversight, with insufficient long-term defense capabilities for Ukraine and without security guarantees from a militarily strong and determined alliance of pro-Ukrainian states, will not inspire confidence.

A man in military uniform stands in front of a burning building in central Lviv, Ukraine, after a Russian drone strike on March 24, 2026. Such a ceasefire could be potentially unstable and hinder Ukraine's recovery and integration into the EU.

Even in the case of an initially stable ceasefire, incomplete control by Kyiv over legitimate Ukrainian territory would complicate, if not make impossible, multiple and long-term security guarantees for Ukraine, as a new escalation would again involve guarantor states in a new Russian-Ukrainian war.

Worse still, an agreement that rewards Russia for violating international law would encourage Moscow to further aggression. A victorious peace would free Russian forces for operations in other regions, which, in turn, would increase the threat from Russia to Europe.

Finally, Ukraine's accession to the EU is unlikely until the security situation in the country is definitively resolved through NATO membership or an equivalent militarily reliable solution.

The promise of defense assistance under Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union will not be a sufficient deterrent against new escalations in its current form due to the lack of military structures within the EU.

Trump's recent initiative regarding the annexation of Greenland has further complicated the situation for Europe. The EU's response was resolute, as Trump's insistence on annexing territory from a European country crossed too many red lines.

The sharpest danger seems to have been averted at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January. However, Trump's style suggests that this issue or similar adventurous ideas may return to the agenda.

New transatlantic tensions increase the risk of a rift not only within the Euro-Atlantic alliance but also among EU member states. For some European countries, the choice in favor of a bilateral security partnership with the U.S. instead of European unity may be an enticing option.

The example of Greenland indicates how the Trump administration might attempt to force Europe to choose between supporting Ukraine on one hand and other European security interests on the other.

For instance, Washington could make Greenland the price for continuing arms sales to Ukraine. Against this backdrop, the EU and Europe as a whole must pursue an even more decisive approach to the continent's security than before.

They must develop a comprehensive strategy and structure for European self-defense that would require little or no involvement from the U.S. It is reassuring that joint European efforts have already allowed for avoiding antagonistic U.S. strategies regarding Ukraine in 2025 and Denmark in early 2026.

However, in light of the midterm elections in the U.S. in the fall of 2026, new pressure from the Trump administration for partial capitulation from Ukraine may arise.

Europe must be prepared for the possibility that mere diplomacy may be insufficient to steer Trump back on the right course. Europeans need to help Ukraine more directly to withstand pressure from the U.S. and be ready to openly confront the Trump administration.