Middle Powers Could Become a New Force in Global Politics

The former head of political planning at the U.S. State Department, now the CEO of the New America think tank, has penned an insightful column exploring the possibilities for middle powers to play a significant role in establishing a new international order. According to the author, a coalition of middle powers could become strong enough to deter the United States, Russia, Israel, and possibly even China and North Korea from using force at their discretion.

This column is co-authored with Stephen B. Heintz, president and CEO of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. During his address at the World Economic Forum in Davos this January, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney not only warned of a 'breakdown' in the international order but also outlined a timely potential alternative. The United States, which once led the formation of the current international order, is now actively undermining it by waging aggressive wars and grossly violating the United Nations Charter.

Carney asserted that middle powers, such as Canada, could 'build a new order that reflects our values, such as respect for human rights, sustainable development, solidarity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of different states.' This statement raises the question: what could this mean in practice? The first step is to provide an honest assessment of the shortcomings and hypocrisy of the current order. Only then can we 'build what we claim to believe in' and create 'institutions and agreements that function as described.'

Some may doubt that a group of middle powers could ever become strong enough to challenge the United States, Russia, Israel, and possibly China and North Korea in the use of force. However, we already know many principles that make a multilateral approach effective: a clear mission and sufficient resources to accomplish it, voting by the principle of a weighted majority, and rules that apply equally to all participants.

Of course, a clear and compelling mission requires a vision of the world we want and can achieve. As management theorist Peter Drucker noted in 1980, the greatest danger in times of turbulence is not the turbulence itself but the desire to cling to yesterday's logic. Instead of continuing to operate based on outdated assumptions, goals, and strategies, we need a 'new logic' of global politics to reduce the number of violent conflicts, ensure a more equitable distribution of prosperity, and achieve sustainability on the planet in this century.

The logic of the future must acknowledge the dual reality of global interdependence and multipolar pluralism. It must reject anthropocentrism in favor of a more comprehensive recognition of all life on our planet. It should recognize the benefits of a fairer distribution of power and shared sovereignty. It must prioritize positive-sum solutions and promote an economy focused on the well-being of people and the planet. And it should place strategic compassion above strategic narcissism.

This vision could garner support from people around the world and would undoubtedly benefit middle powers. After all, scholars, diplomats, foreign policy experts, and activists have been calling for some action from middle powers for many years. However, to realize this or even begin planning, we need to know who exactly qualifies as 'middle powers.'

Wikipedia lists 53 countries that experts have identified as 'middle powers' in the post-Cold War era. Cliff Kupchan of Eurasia Group defines middle powers as countries distinct from the U.S. and China that possess significant geopolitical influence, but he pays particular attention to six 'swing states': Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey. Meanwhile, at the Montaigne Institute, former French diplomat Michel Duclos focuses on 'independent middle powers,' including Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and India, which he refers to as a 'super middle power.'

Notably, many of these analyses pay more attention to developing states than to developed industrial democracies. This is likely because European or Asian middle powers are traditionally seen as part of the European Union, NATO, or 'NATO plus.' Moreover, while the United Kingdom and France may not be able to compete with China or the U.S., they still claim great power status as nuclear states with permanent seats on the UN Security Council.

In any case, from Carney's perspective, representing Canada, most EU members, the United Kingdom, Norway, Switzerland, Japan, South Korea, and Australia could be considered middle powers for certain purposes. Furthermore, the EU is likely to view itself as a bastion of the middle powers' order, at least in military terms.

However, organizing initiatives is always more challenging than compiling lists. Unless a small group of like-minded leaders demonstrates full commitment, the current 'moment for middle powers' will be lost. Perhaps the best approach would be to formulate a credo based on new logic and develop a coherent institutional ecosystem that addresses the global challenges of this century. Only then can other countries decide whether they are ready to join.

The stakes are high. Middle powers currently account for a growing share of global GDP. They control vital natural resources. They have proven themselves to be skilled negotiators in multilateral institutions dominated by a handful of great powers and often find themselves on the front lines, facing the consequences of upheavals caused by climate disasters, geoeconomic instability, and forced migration.