Mykhailo Dubinyansky: The Thorny Path to NATO
On April 4, 2023, Finland officially joined the North Atlantic Alliance, becoming its 31st member. This event marked the end of a long history of Finnish neutrality that lasted 75 years, following a rapid consideration of Helsinki's application for membership after Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
On April 4, 2023, Finland officially joined the North Atlantic Alliance, becoming its 31st member. This event marked the culmination of a swift review of Helsinki's application for membership, submitted in the wake of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Thus, a 75-year-long history of Finnish neutrality came to an end.
On the same day, but 15 years earlier, April 4, 2008, another NATO summit concluded in Bucharest, where Ukraine hoped to receive a Membership Action Plan for joining the alliance but did not achieve the desired outcome. This fateful decision was blocked by German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who were reluctant to provoke Russia. It is known that at that time, Vladimir Putin told U.S. President George W. Bush Jr.: 'You understand, George, that Ukraine is not even a state! What is Ukraine? Part of its territories is Eastern Europe, and a significant part was given to us!'
Today, one can debate whether Ukraine's failure to obtain a Membership Action Plan accelerated Kremlin aggression or, conversely, delayed it. However, one thing remains indisputable: Ukraine's long-standing experience in its movement toward NATO has become a vivid example of miscalculations and failures.
Unlike the Finnish example, joining the North Atlantic Alliance in a historical context depended not only on military strength or the state of democratic institutions but also on the ability to seize favorable opportunities. This was successfully achieved by Turkey, Greece, and West Germany in the 1950s, Eastern European and Baltic countries in the 1990s and 2000s, as well as Finland and Sweden in the 2020s. Unfortunately, Ukraine failed to capitalize on its chance, if it indeed existed.
Theoretically, our window of opportunity coincided with the same timeframe as that of Eastern European and Baltic countries—the second half of the 1990s to the early 2000s. This was a period when the world remained unipolar, and Moscow had not yet recovered from its defeat in the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. At that time, weakened Russia could not prevent countries eager to leave the Kremlin's orbit.
However, in practice, Ukraine at that time remained a successor to the USSR, and its position cannot be compared to that of Poland, Romania, Latvia, or Estonia. Attributing to Ukrainians of the Kravchuk and Kuchma eras modern sentiments and beliefs distorts history. Back then, Kyiv was forced to choose not between neutrality and NATO membership but between a compromise 'multivectorism' and becoming a Russian satellite.
The notion of the similarity between post-Soviet Ukraine and other Eastern European countries gained popularity only belatedly, just as our desire to follow their example did. By that time, the historical window of opportunity had already closed, and the Kremlin was able to build up its forces and take a course toward revenge.
Shortly thereafter, Ukraine's exclusion from NATO became a Moscow idée fixe, which found support among influential Western leaders. In such conditions, Ukraine's declarative aspiration to join NATO turned into an irritant for the Kremlin, a scarecrow for Moscow's propaganda, a convenient pretext for aggression, but nothing more. Ukraine's chances of joining the alliance turned out to be illusory.
Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, countries joined NATO to protect themselves from armed aggression and avoid the horrors of war. However, none of these objectives were fulfilled by Ukraine. Large-scale military conflicts, destroyed and occupied cities, hundreds of thousands dead and wounded—this became the reality Ukraine faced despite its lack of NATO membership.
Additionally, Ukraine remains the only country in the world whose course toward NATO membership is enshrined in its Constitution. Thus, until recently, Ukraine could be viewed as a classic counterexample: this is what happens to those who miss their chance and try to catch a train that has already left.
However, there is one important 'but.' By spring 2026, no one can claim that countries that did not miss their historical chance and joined NATO in time will not repeat Ukraine's fate. Today, full membership in the alliance does not appear to be the same guarantee of security as it did a year and a half ago. The former NATO architecture, built around American military potential, is beginning to crumble before our eyes.
The administration of Donald Trump regularly raises complaints against European partners, accusing them of ingratitude and abusing American support. In Washington, the possibility of dismantling the North Atlantic Treaty is openly discussed, and the question of whether the legendary Article Five will work in case of need remains open.
At the same time, Russia's plans to attack the Baltics are actively discussed. During the Cold War, invading any NATO country remained a strategic taboo for the Kremlin. However, today's NATO is viewed by the Kremlin as flawed and unfit, believing that countries that joined it did so deceitfully, and that they should not have left the Russian orbit. Perhaps Moscow is ready to rectify this 'injustice' through military means if it is confident that Washington will not defend Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
It is currently difficult to say what protects Narva and the Suwalki Corridor more—the formidable image of NATO or the fact that Ukrainians are holding back the main Russian forces. Potential victims of Moscow hope that Trump will not sacrifice them to the Russian army, but they do not rule out that the Kremlin, bogged down in Ukraine, will not risk opening a second front in the Baltics.
This situation is ironic: a country that failed to hide behind NATO's collective shield indirectly protects those who have been members of the alliance for over 20 years. This is an important point for the future of Ukraine and Europe.
Frankly, we have very little chance of joining the same North Atlantic Treaty Organization that denied Ukraine membership 18 years ago. However, given the modern challenges, it is important to remember that history is not over, and opportunities may arise at the most unexpected moment.