One Tune Game: How Russia Attempts to Silence Alternative Social Networks in Its Own and Occupied Territories

In recent weeks, Telegram, which has remained one of the last threads connecting Russians to the outside world, has significantly deteriorated in functionality. According to the international research project Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI), the intensity of blocking this messenger reached 86% last Sunday. This level of blocking is now comparable to that of the already banned messenger Signal. The trend of worsening access to Telegram has been evident since the end of March. Observers note that Telegram is likely to become the next 'banned' platform in Russia after Signal, Instagram, Facebook, X, as well as VPNs and independent media.

The dynamics of Telegram suppression are also being monitored in temporarily occupied territories thanks to the Relocated Media Cluster, established by the public organization DII-Ukraine. This coalition consists of editorial teams that previously operated in areas now under occupation but have managed to resume their activities elsewhere while maintaining ties to their home regions. Currently, the Cluster includes 15 media outlets, such as 'Donbas News', 0629.com.ua (Mariupol), 'Tribune' (Luhansk region), 'RIA-South', 'Free Radio', and others.

The Cluster unites editorial teams that prepare analytics and investigations about occupied territories, monitor social media, write reports on ongoing events, and simultaneously seek ways to retain their pro-Ukrainian audience. The Cluster is closely following the situation with Telegram in the temporarily occupied territories, as it remains one of the few tools available for communication.

Unlike the Russian territory, where Telegram, WhatsApp, Viber, and Signal are blocked, these messengers are still operational in temporarily occupied areas. There is no demand for Signal, as local residents ignore this secure messenger. The reason is that installing it on a phone may lead to repressions, prompting people to avoid using 'risky' applications.

As of the morning of April 6, communication via Telegram in the temporarily occupied territories was available. For instance, in the Kherson region, messengers, internet, and telephony were functioning until 10:00 PM on April 5, when an attack by Ukrainian drones caused a power outage, leading to internet disconnection. In some populated areas, electricity was restored; however, the overall situation remained unstable.

In occupied Luhansk, communication was also accessible. However, in Melitopol and the Melitopol district, connectivity entirely depends on electricity supply, and during outages, online communication becomes impossible. Local residents have noted that power outages have become more frequent than before.

As of the morning of April 6, it was impossible to reach the occupied part of Donetsk via Telegram. However, people from there can call the Ukrainian-controlled territory without issues, and the level of connectivity remains satisfactory. A similar situation is observed in Berdyansk and the Berdyansk district.

A notable feature of Donetsk is that in the early days of April, official Telegram channels of local representatives of the occupying authorities almost ceased updating. However, as of today, the activity of these Telegram channels has revived. Users speculate that there is likely no audience in the MAX messenger if the occupiers have decided to return to Telegram.

MAX is essentially a tool of Russian special services that is being aggressively promoted in Russia. Alongside aggressive advertising on television, the internet, and among bloggers, coercive methods are also employed in temporarily occupied territories.

The methods of pressure are classic. All employees of municipal enterprises and institutions, as well as those receiving regional or federal funding, are required to install MAX under the threat of job loss. Similar demands apply to school and university teachers, as well as preschool educators. Moreover, teachers are compelled to make their students use this messenger. Some even assign homework through MAX to encourage children to install it. During parent-teacher meetings, there is also campaigning, with parents being pressured with threats of 'problems' for their children.

The list of state services that people will not be able to access without installing MAX is also expanding. For example, obtaining certificates and permits now requires registration through MAX. In the village of Nizhni Sirogozy in the Kherson region, to reissue land documents, one must register via MAX. In Melitopol, those registered in the messenger are promised expedited access to state services. However, local residents report that this is a deception, as those registered in MAX also have to stand in line for certificates.

Official channels of law enforcement agencies have stopped providing detailed accounts of high-profile crimes. They now limit themselves to a single sentence, inviting readers to MAX for more details.

This is a long-term, massive campaign aimed at drawing the entire population into the messenger for total control. However, people are actively seeking ways to circumvent these coercive measures, and each such attempt to distance themselves from the very persistent recommendations is undertaken at their own risk.