Security, Strategy and Skullduggery: Public Opinion in the Balkans

A poll of 10,000 people in 11 countries reveals a regional split between the West and Russia. While Kosovo and Albania trust NATO, Bulgaria and Greece remain pessimistic and prone to disinformation. Make us preferred on Google Share Facebook X (Twitter) LinkedIn Bluesky Email Copy Copied Attendees observe 16 minutes of silence during a gathering marking the first anniversary of the Novi Sad railway station tragedy, in Novi Sad, on November 1, 2025. (Photo by Andrej ISAKOVIC / AFP) Content Share Facebook X (Twitter) LinkedIn Bluesky Email Copy Copied Flip Make us preferred on Google I hope to help set the scene for our Forum with some polling conducted throughout the Balkans and the wider region, completed earlier this month. I surveyed more than 10,000 people in 11 countries: Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Turkey. We have looked domestic priorities, confidence in democracy, foreign interference and disinformation, and of course defence and security and the competing alliances that come face to face in this fascinating and critical part of the world. (Infographic by Lord Ashcroft/X) Follow our coverage of the war on the @Kyivpost_official . When we asked people for the biggest issues facing their country, inflation and the cost of living topped the list, as we might expect. Second overall was corruption – indeed this was the number one issue in Bosnia and Serbia, and a very close second in Romania. The economy and jobs and poverty and inequality were next overall, but there were some striking variations by country: internal conflict and division were top-three issues in Bosnia and Serbia, while organised crime and drug trafficking were named fourth in Serbia and third in Montenegro. (Infographic by Lord Ashcroft/X) Other Topics of Interest Ukraine Says Russian-Linked Network Planned Killings and Sabotage Across EU Prosecutors said an international operation disrupted a network preparing assassinations, arson, and infrastructure attacks in multiple European countries. Across the region, people tended to be pessimistic for the future of their country, especially in Greece and Bulgaria. Once again, the exceptions to this gloomy outlook were Albania, Montenegro and Kosovo, where clear majorities said they were optimistic. North Macedonians were also more likely to take a positive view of the future. (Infographic by Lord Ashcroft/X) Perhaps not surprisingly then, Albanians and Kosovans were the most likely to say that when it came to politics in their country, they wanted to keep things stable. Across the board, people wanted to see moderate or, more likely, fundamental change – especially, once again, in Bulgaria and Greece. (Infographic by Lord Ashcroft/X) As to how that change was likely to come about, we found widely varying levels of trust in the democratic process. Only in three countries – Albania, Montenegro and cheery Kosovo – did a majority say they were confident that their elections were conducted fairly and that the results reflected the wishes of the people. In Bulgaria and Serbia, nearly half of respondents said they were not at all confident that this was the case. (Infographic by Lord Ashcroft/X) Looking at another aspect of democracy, we find some ambivalent attitudes to media freedom. Overall, and in all but two individual countries, people were more likely to agree it was important to ensure people were not exposed to misinformation than to ensure the media were free to report without restrictions. If that seems alarming to those inclined to defend the free press at all costs, there are perhaps two things to bear in mind. (Infographic by Lord Ashcroft/X) One is that in six of our countries, the single biggest source of news was social media – such as Instagram, Facebook, YouTube and TikTok, with online news sites also accounting for a substantial proportion of news consumption. People know they are not living in an age of balanced and responsible journalism. The other point is that – no doubt for that very reason – a large chunk of the population has little faith in what they see, read and hear. In some of the countries surveyed, nearly half our respondents said they somewhat or completely distrust the information they get from the news media. (Infographic by Lord Ashcroft/X) There is another element to this suspicion. In nearly all the countries we surveyed, clear majorities agreed that foreign countries were trying to influence their politics through misinformation, propaganda and other methods. This was particularly true in Bosnia and Bulgaria, where seven in ten respondents believed they were the targets of such a campaign. They are absolutely right about this, of course. We regularly hear at these gatherings about efforts to influence opinion and debate in target countries, especially through social media, and often at the behest of Russia. As part of this research I commissioned some analysis of this kind of activity in one of our countries, Bosnia. (Infographic by Lord Ashcroft/X) This sinister image is not a still from a  Star Wars  film but a map of Twitter or X activity in Bosnia last month. Each dot represents an individual user, and the clusters illustrate groups of connected users. The red dots represent 83 pro-Russia “bots”, and their positions on the map indicate how they integrate themselves into the various clusters and conversations. A bot, as you will know, is a fake or automated account that can post, like or share messages on its own, following a set of rules designed to help further its owner’s agenda. Bots generate their own content, retweet each other’s posts, and boost genuine posts that suit their purpose, looking out for key words and phrases. They can post at inhuman frequency, and repeat the same content or talking points relentlessly. But as the AI gets more sophisticated, they become both harder to spot and more effective at amplifying messages that suit their creator – in this case, the Kremlin. (Infographic by Lord Ashcroft/X) Here, each line represents a conversation or message, and the colour of the line denotes the sender. This shows the sheer volume of activity from pro-Russian bots, and how they have managed to insinuate themselves to every aspect of Bosnia’s online discourse, at least on X. (Infographic by Lord Ashcroft/X) For comparison, here is an equivalent map from Georgia. We can see that this information environment is much more heavily contested, with pro-West and pro-Russia accounts slugging it out in the Twittersphere. (Infographic by Lord Ashcroft/X) The contrast with Bosnia is stark. But what kind of messages are these bots trying to push? (Infographic by Lord Ashcroft/X) Messages are not usually overtly pro-Russian. As these examples show, they aim to sow division between ethnic groups, suggest that Bosnia has failed as a state and should separate into independent enclaves, keep the war of the 1990s front and centre, and try to restrict public support for the EU, NATO, the US and the west. Much recent content focuses on the Middle East, sometimes claiming that Iran supported Bosnia during the 1990s conflict while Israel supported the Serbs, or drawing a parallel between US bombing of Iran today and Serbia in the 90s – a message aimed at the Serb minority. (Infographic by Lord Ashcroft/X) Evidence of Russian interference in domestic political discourse is pretty clear. But when we asked our survey respondents which countries they thought were trying to influence them, only Kosovars and Romanians named Russia as the biggest culprit. Overall, and in nine of our eleven countries, the entity thought most likely to be trying to influence domestic politics was the United States. And close behind Russia in third place – second in Bulgaria, Croatia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Romania and Serbia – was the European Union. In Greece and Turkey, the country thought second most likely to try and exert influence was Israel. Relatively few thought they detected interference from Iran, Saudi Arabia or the Gulf. (Infographic by Lord Ashcroft/X) Whoever they think is doing the interfering, clear majorities in all the countries we surveyed think it is having at least some effect. A substantial minority – and getting on for half of respondents in Bosnia, Bulgaria, Greece and Romania – think such activity has a major impact, to the extent that it could affect election results or government policies in their country. (Infographic by Lord Ashcroft/X) If this propaganda effort amounts to a battle for hearts and minds, let’s look at how different populations in the region perceive their allies and adversaries, and their defence and security interests. Across the region, favourability towards the US was closely divided, but with striking variations between countries. Albanians and Kosovars were the most positive, with those in North Macedonia and Romania also more likely to be favourable than not. The reverse was true in Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Montenegro, Serbia and – especially – Turkey. People everywhere but Serbia tended to have a favourable view of the EU, and Kosovars were the only population to take an unfavourable view of China. Greeks were the only country where people were more likely than not to have an unfavourable view of Germany. When it came to Russia, aggregate opinion was unfavourable – but in four countries it was more positive than negative, and opinion was closely divided in Bosnia and Greece. (Infographic by Lord Ashcroft/X) Overall, people in the region saw the United States more as a partner than a threat, with populations in five of our countries tending to take this view. Opinion was closely divided in Bosnia and Croatia, but those in Bulgaria, Montenegro, Serbia and – especially – Turkey were more likely to see the US as a threat than a partner. (Infographic by Lord Ashcroft/X) Among respondents as a whole, the answer was almost a mirror image when we asked about Russia. Majorities in five of our countries – most notably Albania, Kosovo and Romania – saw Russia as a threat. But in another five – including a majority in Serbia – people were more likely to see Russia as a partner than a menace. (Infographic by Lord Ashcroft/X) How closely engaged they want to be with potential allies on either side is another question. Populations in five of the seven non-EU states we surveyed said they wanted to join the European Union, including big majorities in Albania and Kosovo. In Serbia and Turkey, people were more divided or ambivalent. While a plurality in both countries wanted to join, substantial minorities said they would like a closer relationship but not full membership – and a fifth of Serbs and a quarter of Turks said they would rather keep their distance altogether. (Infographic by Lord Ashcroft/X) We see another dimension when we ask about defence and security. A clear majority in Turkey said they would prefer to maintain their own independent defence, rather than work more closely with other countries in the region or further afield. Those in Romania, North Macedonia and – especially – Albania and Kosovo prioritised a strong relationship with the NATO and the United States. Those in Montenegro were the most likely to want closer defence co-operation with other Balkan countries, an ambition which sadly did not seem to be shared by many of their neighbours. Those in Croatia and Greece were more drawn to the idea of working with other countries in Europe. (Infographic by Lord Ashcroft/X) When it came to NATO, majorities in most of the member states we surveyed supported their country’s place in the alliance. There were wide variations, however – from 95 per cent in Albania to only just over half in Bulgaria. And in Montenegro we found opinion quite closely divided, with a small majority saying they were unhappy with their NATO membership. (Infographic by Lord Ashcroft/X) Asking our three non-member countries whether they would like to join was a slightly academic question, but instructive nonetheless. Four out of five Kosovars say they would like to join NATO, but this ambition is some way off given that four existing NATO members don’t recognise their country as a sovereign state. Serbia’s neutrality laws prevent it from joining a military bloc, but it seemed rude not to ask what they thought. In fact, one in ten Serbs said they would like to join, and overall they were closely divided between wanting a closer relationship with NATO and wanting to keep their distance. In Bosnia, which officially aspires to membership, opinion was also less clear cut. Only 36 per cent said they wanted to join, with another one in three saying they wanted a closer relationship with NATO but not full membership. More than one in five said they would rather distance themselves from the organisation. (Infographic by Lord Ashcroft/X) It also proved revealing to ask people how confident they were that NATO would step in to defend them if they were attacked. Albanians were the most confident, followed by Kosovars, who have good reason given the presence of KFOR for the last 27 years. Elsewhere, people were considerably more doubtful. Two thirds of Romanians and just over half of Croatians and North Macedonians thought they could rely on NATO intervention. But in Bulgaria opinion was evenly divided, while in Greece, Montenegro and Turkey people were more likely than not to say they had little or no confidence that NATO would defend them. Notably, people were more confident of NATO’s protection in Bosnia, which isn’t a member, than in Greece, which is. (Infographic by Lord Ashcroft/X) To bring things together, we asked people where they thought their countries’ interests and loyalties should lie in the bigger global picture. The answers clearly illustrate the tensions still at work in the region. Asked whether they should choose to be an ally of Russia or the United States, people in eight of our eleven countries favoured the US – but sometimes not by very much, and majorities in Montenegro and Turkey wanted to remain neutral between the two. The Bulgarians, Serbs and Turks leant more towards Russia than the United States. (Infographic by Lord Ashcroft/X) Presenting the same choice between Russia and the European Union, we find respondents in all countries except Serbia leaning more towards the EU. As with the US, however, preference for the EU varied widely, from fewer than half in Bulgaria and Montenegro to more than 90 per cent in Kosovo and Albania. (Infographic by Lord Ashcroft/X) More broadly, we asked how their country felt more aligned: with Russia and the East, or with America, Europe and the West. In most countries, people leant clearly to the West – but in Bulgaria, Serbia and Turkey, Russia and the East was the more popular answer. A further one in three Turks thought they were equally aligned with the two, and people in Montenegro were evenly spread between the three options. (Infographic by Lord Ashcroft/X) Finally, as if the history of the Balkans were not sufficiently beset with tribal divisions, we have analysed our polling data to create some more. Our 10,000 sample divides into four distinct groups, each with a different combination of opinions and attitudes. They appear in different proportions in each of the countries we polled. The segment we’ve called “Authoritarian Pessimists” favour Russia and China over western actors like the US and the EU, want to keep their distance from NATO and think their countries are doing too much for Ukraine. They worry about the cost of living, corruption, their country’s near-term future and foreign disinformation, which they largely attribute to the Americans and the EU. They favour strong leadership, are sceptical of the electoral process, value sovereignty and independence, and want to see fundamental political change. Membership of this group is most prevalent in Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Montenegro, and among older, Orthodox Christian men. Our “Strategic Europeanists”, if you will forgive the term, are also pessimistic and economically anxious, but tend to support market economies and value democracy even if they lack confidence in their own country’s elections. They are broadly pro-west and favour EU and NATO membership but are strongly critical of the US and Israel. They are also concerned about disinformation, which they attribute to both Russia and the US. They tend to blame Russia for the war in Ukraine but believe their countries are providing appropriate support. These people are geographically dispersed but more prevalent in Bosnia and Turkey. Around a quarter of our populations are “Committed Westerners”, favouring close ties with Europe, the US and NATO, and holding negative views of Russia, China and Iran. The segment is heavily concentrated in Kosovo and Albania, and skews towards older and rural populations. They place greater emphasis on language, nationality and ethnicity as a basis for connection, and are often religious, including many Muslims. Though concerned about the economy and the cost of living and migration, they are optimistic for their countries and express confidence in democracy. “Independent Neutrals” are broadly ambivalent towards major international players, and somewhat more positive towards the EU and China than towards the US and Russia. They emphasise independence and sovereignty and favour neutrality over alignment. Though widely dispersed the segment is most concentrated in Greece, Romania, Montenegro and North Macedonia, skews towards older women and is typically Orthodox. Jobs, prices, poverty and corruption are major concerns, they tend towards the pessimistic, want to see fundamental political change and doubt that democratic processes work fairly. This model clearly oversimplifies things. But it illustrates some of the conflicts and opposing narratives at stake, and how competing loyalties go hand in hand with shared anxieties. Full data available at LordAshcroftPolls.com Lord Ashcroft KCMG PC is an international businessman, philanthropist, author and pollster.