Magyar's Russian energy phase-out plan for Hungary falls short

Péter Magyar, leader of the pro-European conservative TISZA party, in Budapest, Hungary, on April 12, 2026. (Ferenc Isza/AFP/Getty Images) Prefer on Google by Martin Fornusek Peter Magyar's plan to end Hungary's reliance on Russian fossil fuels seems to lack urgency — and risks perpetuating Viktor Orban's legacy. Magyar 's Tisza party, which is to form the new government in May, has set 2035 as the deadline to end the country's energy reliance on Moscow. But experts argue that Hungary could pivot much faster, as long as there is "political will." Non-Russian fossil fuel supply routes, such as Croatia's Adria oil pipeline or liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals accessible via interconnected infrastructure, offer viable alternatives. Tisza's current timeline could put Budapest on a collision course with the EU 's plans to phase out Russian gas by November 2027, risking Magyar's plans for rapprochement with Brussels. It could also threaten Hungary's security and allow Russian influence to persist, analysts say. Reliance on Russian energy has been deeply embedded in Orban's "political economy," says Tsvetomir Nikolov, an analyst for the Energy and Climate Program of the Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD), a Sofia-based European policy institute. If Magyar leaves it intact, "it will continue to sustain the same governance mechanisms that have progressively eroded institutional resilience." Turning Hungary away from Moscow and back into Europe was a central part of Magyar's platform. But after securing his victory, Magyar spoke cautiously on energy. "No one can change geography; Russia and Hungary are here to stay," Magyar said during his post-election press conference on April 13. "The government will procure crude oil and gas in the cheapest and safest way possible." The arguments echo those of his rival Orban, who has cast Hungary's dependence on Russian energy as a geographic inevitability and a necessity for keeping consumer prices low. Hungary and Slovakia are the only EU countries still enjoying the exemption from a ban on buying Russian pipeline crude — and they used it to entrench their reliance only further. Between 2021 and 2025, the share of Russian gas in Hungary's imports rose from 60% to 90%, and crude from 61% to 93%, according to a 2026 report published by the CSD . Most of Russia's oil has been flowing to Hungary via the southern branch of the Druzhba pipeline, passing through Ukraine. Duna oil refinery, which is operated by MOL Hungarian Oil & Gas Plc and receives crude via the Druzhba pipeline, in Százhalombatta, Hungary, on May 24, 2022. (Janos Kummer/Getty Images) Relying on a pipeline going through an active war zone has proved risky, as became clear when it went offline for several months following a Russian strike in western Ukraine. The disruption has left Hungary vulnerable to rising energy prices — compounded by the war in the Middle East — but also highlighted viable alternatives. The Adria pipeline, operated by Croatia's state-owned Janaf company, runs from a terminal at the Adriatic Sea to refineries in southern Europe, Hungary, and — through a Druzhba link — to Slovakia. Janaf says its pipeline has enough capacity to supply Mol's Hungarian and Slovak refineries. While the two facilities were designed mainly to process Russian Urals grade, Mol said they should be capable of operating fully on non-Russian crude by the end of 2026. Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) analysts have also challenged Mol's claims that Janaf charges excessive transit fees, noting that the Croatian operator charged 12.2 euros ($14) per ton in 2024 compared with 21 euros ($25) charged by Ukraine. While the outgoing Hungarian government has maintained that Russian supplies are vital, Mol is already eyeing a long-term cooperation with Janaf. In March, the two companies began a 10-month capacity-testing period on the Adria pipeline to assess whether it could be developed into a fully viable supply route. An EU diplomatic source also confirmed to the Kyiv Independent that during Druzhba disruptions, Adria was supplying non-Russian crude to Slovakia. Much like with oil, the Orban government has deepened reliance on Russian gas flowing via TurkStream, cemented by a 15-year contract with Gazprom signed in 2021. "In gas, the constraints are likewise less binding than the Hungarian government often suggests," Nikolov says. Alternatives include Croatia's Krk LNG terminal and the Hungarian-Romanian interconnector. Expanding regional links — namely the Vertical Gas Corridor project — potentially unlocks other options, such as access to further LNG entry points. Workers weld a section of the Vertical Gas Corridor pipeline, a project designed to connect the natural gas networks of Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Moldova, and Ukraine, near Mikrevo, Bulgaria, on May 29, 2025. (Nikolay Doychinov/AFP/Getty Images) Still under Orban's purview, Hungary has concluded new deals for non-Russian gas with Azerbaijan , Shell , the U.S.'s Chevron , and the French company Engie. "The gas transition would take longer than oil, given existing long-term contracts with Gazprom," Luke Wickenden, an energy analyst at CREA, told the Kyiv Independent. "But the physical infrastructure is already in place, and the EU deadline of end-2027 is achievable if Hungary begins contracting alternative supplies now." Another pathway to diversification is renewables, and Tisza has vowed to double the share of renewable energy by 2040. "The binding constraint (for energy diversification before 2035) is not technical feasibility," Nikolov argues. "It is political will." The economic justification for Russian imports has also faced scrutiny. Mol, Hungary's largest energy company with ties to Orban, has made a profit on discounted Russian oil, reportedly saving about 47 million euros ($55 million) per month last year. However, Hungarians have not seen these savings reflected in their energy bills. "Hungarian consumers saw none of this benefit: pre-tax petrol prices were 18% higher and diesel 10% higher than in Czechia in 2025," Wickenden told the Kyiv Independent. Czechia previously enjoyed the same Russian oil exemption as Hungary and Slovakia but moved away from Russian supplies last year, as did Bulgaria in 2024. Rather than benefiting Hungarian consumers, Russia's energy ties are a "vehicle for state capture," working through entities linked to Russian business interests and figures close to Orban, researchers say. Then-Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban speaks to the press at the European headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, on Jan. 22, 2026. (Ludovic Marin / AFP via Getty Images) "Discounted Russian energy, regulatory exemptions, and opaque intermediary arrangements have generated rents, protected politically connected business networks, and reinforced a broader pattern of state capture," said Nikolov. Among these intermediaries is the Swiss-registered MET Group, whose shareholders include associates of Orban, or Normeston Trading SA, a firm with complex offshore structures and long-standing ties to Mol and Russia's Lukoil energy company, researchers say. Nearly a decade of ongoing reliance leaves Russia with a foot in the door of Hungarian politics. It also leaves Hungary at the mercy of geopolitical turbulence. As the EU aims to end Russian gas imports by November 2027, with a ban on Russian oil soon to follow, it remains unclear how Magyar aims to tackle the issue. Orban's government, together with Slovakia, challenged the EU's phase-out plans at the European Court of Justice. If he takes on the lawsuit, Magyar would likely face an early fight with Brussels, potentially complicating his plan to unlock about 17 billion euros ($20 billion) in frozen funds. The Kyiv Independent has reached out to Tisza and Magyar's incoming energy and economy minister, Istvan Kapitany, on how they plan to reconcile their own diversification deadline with the EU's RePower plan. They have not provided a response at the time of publication. Another open question is the Paks II nuclear power plant project led by Russia's Rosatom, which Tisza "merely" promised to "review." Russian President Vladimir Putin (L) meets with Director General of the Russian Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom Alexey Likhachev (R) outside Moscow, Russia, on May 19, 2022. (Mikhail Klimentyev / Sputnik / AFP via Getty Images) Finally, geopolitics are sure to have a major impact on Hungary's — and potentially Europe's — plans to move away from Russian energy. This decade has seen a cascade of sudden, sharp energy price spikes: from the Covid-19 pandemic to Russia's all-out invasion of Ukraine to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. "If the global markets, including energy markets, stabilize, the adjustment (by Hungary and the EU) can be done relatively fast at reasonable costs," says Andrej Nosko, a Central European energy policy and security expert at Matej Bel University in Banska Bystrica. But the expert warns against exchanging reliance on Russian energy for another dependence — specifically, U.S. imports. "Changing disproportionate reliance on imports from Russia to disproportionate reliance on imports from the U.S. does not in itself reduce energy security risk," Nosko told the Kyiv Independent. "It replaces one risk for another, especially in the context when there appears to be close strategic alignment between Russia and the U.S. against the EU." Kyiv Independent reporter Chris Powers has contributed to the article. I hope you enjoyed this article. In our team, we believe fact-based and truthful reporting should be available to all – that's why we don't use any paywall. If you want to see more in-depth coverage of regional politics and how it shapes Ukraine's struggle against Russian aggression, please consider joining the Kyiv Independent community. Martin Fornusek is a reporter for the Kyiv Independent, specializing in international and regional politics, history, and disinformation. Based in Lviv, Martin often reports on international politics, with a focus on analyzing developments related to Ukraine and Russia. His career in journalism began in 2021 after graduating from Masaryk University in Brno, Czechia, earning a Master's degree in Conflict and Democracy Studies. Martin has been invited to speak on Times Radio, France 24, Czech Television, and Radio Free Europe. He speaks English, Czech, and Ukrainian.