How Western Materials for Cigarettes End Up in Russian Missiles Targeting Ukraine
A new investigation reveals that Russia is utilizing imported raw materials from European companies to manufacture key military equipment, including missiles, despite years of sanctions.
According to a recent investigation published by the analytical center StateWatch and United24 Media on April 3, Russia is using imported raw materials from European companies to produce crucial military equipment, including missiles. The investigation uncovered documents showing how cellulose acetate, manufactured by the European company Cerdia, passes through intermediaries in the tobacco industry before ultimately reaching a Russian factory critical for the production of Kalibr cruise missiles.
These findings highlight the continued presence of Western materials in Moscow's weaponry, despite years of sanctions. Cellulose acetate, a chemical compound widely used in the cigarette industry, belongs to a broader class of cellulose derivatives that are essential for the production of gunpowder and rocket fuel. Russia lacks the capacity for mass production of cellulose acetate and heavily relies on imports.
European company Cerdia, a leading global producer of cellulose acetate, sold its products to intermediaries, who then supplied the materials to the Russian Perm Powder Plant—a state-owned enterprise that produces rocket fuel and plays a key role in the supply chain for Kalibr cruise missiles. This factory is already under European Union sanctions due to its contribution to Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine.
A letter to the Perm Powder Plant from Russian missile manufacturer NPO Novator, part of the Almaz-Antey conglomerate, discusses the necessity of using imported cellulose acetate due to the absence of Russian alternatives. The documents also indicate that cellulose derivatives are used in the production of several types of Russian weaponry, including guided bombs KAB-500 and KAB-1500, S-300 and Buk air defense systems, as well as the intercontinental ballistic missile Yars.
Documents obtained by StateWatch, including customs data and internal company contracts, show that materials purchased from European companies have reached the Perm Powder Plant and were used in missile production. Specifically, the investigation revealed that at least 30 tons of cellulose acetate were procured from Cerdia.
Records from the Perm Powder Plant also contained a letter from Cerdia regarding the supply of cellulose acetate flakes. The letter from the European company Cerdia, confirming the continuation of cellulose acetate flake supplies, was likely found among the documents of the Perm Powder Plant, according to the investigation by StateWatch and United24 Media. Internal contracts indicate the key role played by A2 Group LLC, an intermediary supplying foreign products to the Russian defense industry. This company does not appear as an importer in customs data but rather purchases cellulose acetate from tobacco companies, the primary civilian market for the product.
Russian companies Gulbahars Rus and Sertova have imported Cerdia's products worth millions of dollars into the country since the onset of the full-scale war, the investigation found. Gulbahars Rus is a tobacco company, while Sertova appears to be a link between civilian imports and the Russian defense industry.
Sertova has confirmed connections with Russian defense enterprises, including several contracts with the Perm Powder Plant. The findings of the investigation point to a multilayered system of sanctions evasion that supplies foreign raw materials to the Russian defense industry. Materials are imported into Russia through civilian companies, purchased by intermediaries, and then reach military production facilities, where they end up in missiles and bombs that attack Ukrainian cities.
Although Western countries have banned the export of many dual-use components to Russia, Moscow has adapted to the sanctions by relying on third countries, complex schemes, and smuggling networks to obtain restricted goods. An investigation by the Kyiv Independent in February revealed that European supply chains still move industrial chemicals into the Russian military machine, exploiting loopholes in EU sanctions to maintain the flow of dual-use chemicals to Russia.