What Does Poczobut’s Release Mean for Polish-Belarusian Relations?

After five years in captivity as political prisoner, Andrzej Poczobut was freed, marking a key win for Poland. But does it signal a new opening with Belarus? Make us preferred on Google Share Facebook X (Twitter) LinkedIn Bluesky Email Copy Copied Andrzej Poczobut - a correspondent for the top Polish daily Gazeta Wyborcza and a representative of the Polish minority in Belarus, who was arrested in March 2021 and accused of “calling for actions aimed at harming national security” as well as inciting hatred, appears at the Grodno regional court on January 16, 2023. (Photo by Leonid SHCHEGLOV / BELTA / AFP) Content Share Facebook X (Twitter) LinkedIn Bluesky Email Copy Copied Flip Make us preferred on Google Andrzej Poczobut, a Belarusian journalist, opposition figure and political prisoner, was released as part of a five-for-five prisoner exchange on Tuesday, April 27. The success of the operation was not solely the result of Polish-Belarusian talks, but also of the involvement of other countries, including Romania and Moldova. The exchange would not have taken place without the participation of the United States, as confirmed by John Coale, special envoy to Belarus. Russia also played a role, which is hardly surprising given the degree of its control over Belarus. Belarusian KGB officials even thanked Russia’s FSB for its significant contribution. Without a green light from Moscow, the operation would not have been possible. Follow our coverage of the war on the @Kyivpost_official . In this context, it is worth noting US policy, which for some time has been moving toward a thaw in relations with Lukashenko’s regime. Sanctions have been lifted on potash fertilizers and the Belarusian airline Belavia, as well as other sectors, in exchange for the release of political prisoners. This warming of US-Belarus relations does not, however, amount to pulling Minsk away from Russian influence. The Kremlin indirectly benefits from such a reset, and the easing of sanctions on Belarusian entities also supports the Russian economy and enables it to circumvent restrictions. Are US actions a step toward a broader reset? It is difficult to say with certainty. Despite a degree of easing, the situation remains risky for both Poland and the Baltic states. Belarus, despite the lifting of sanctions on potash fertilizers, cannot export them without access to the Lithuanian port of Klaipėda. Opening such a route would require approval from the European Union as well as the willingness of Lithuania itself. Other Topics of Interest Ukraine Extends Household Electricity Tariff Until October 2026 Households will continue paying Hr. 4.32 ($0.098) per kilowatt-hour (kWh), while electric‑heated homes keep a lower winter tariff, the government said. Why is the situation challenging for Poland and the Baltic states? On the one hand, a reduction in tensions is beneficial. On the other, there is a clear understanding that a return to “business as usual” with Russia and Belarus leads nowhere good. The Kremlin’s plans remain aggressive, and Belarus – effectively its satellite – has more than once signaled openness to the West. This is part of Lukashenko’s modus operandi. For more than five years, Andrzej Poczobut was effectively Lukashenko’s hostage. In this way, the Belarusian regime constrained Poland’s room for maneuver. In response to repression, Warsaw closed, among other things, border crossings with Belarus. Securing Poczobut’s release was a shared objective across successive Polish governments. The future of Polish-Belarusian relations largely depends on Minsk. In the short term, it is reasonable to expect that Lukashenko will refrain from detaining further individuals for political reasons, especially those linked to Poland – though it is unclear how long this will last. Poczobut’s release certainly gives Warsaw greater flexibility. Prime Minister of Lithuania Inga Ruginiene commenting on the development, stated that during her planned June meeting with Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, she would discuss the possible resumption of contacts with Belarus. It is also a fact that the migration pressure organized by Minsk on the Polish-Belarusian border since 2021 has significantly decreased. While a reduction of tensions on the Belarusian border may be neutral for Ukraine, a broader thaw in relations is more problematic. Not long ago, President Zelensky strengthened ties with Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya while simultaneously hardening his stance toward Lukashenko. If the United States moves toward a reset with Belarus, the importance of the Belarusian opposition may diminish, and Western leaders may increasingly engage directly with the authorities in Minsk. Lukashenko would undoubtedly seek to use this situation to legitimize his rule, which is widely regarded as illegitimate. For Warsaw and Vilnius, greater freedom within Belarus – even under the current regime – would in practice mean pushing Russian influence further away from their borders. However, the political class is aware that this may be yet another tactical maneuver by the regime rather than a lasting policy shift. From Kyiv’s perspective, another problematic issue is that Alexander Batyugin, an archaeologist exchanged for Poczobut, had been expected to be extradited from Poland to Ukraine. Heorhii Tykhyi, spokesperson for Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told BBC Ukraine that Kyiv received the decision with regret, although the lack of reaction from top officials may indicate an understanding of the situation. Ukraine itself has, on multiple occasions, handed over ordinary criminals to Russia in exchange for its defenders. From Russia’s perspective, this may have been an attempt to “kill two birds with one stone” – to carry out the exchange while also provoking diplomatic tensions between Warsaw and Kyiv. As it turned out, this did not succeed. A key challenge for the Belarusian opposition is not only positioning itself vis-à-vis Western partners, but also continuing the struggle for the release of political prisoners. According to Human Rights Center Viasna, there are over 800 such prisoners, though the real number may reach several thousand. They are, however, far less recognizable than Poczobut. Much of the elite associated with the 2020 protests has already left Belarusian prisons. Those who remain do not always wish to be labeled as political prisoners, as this may complicate life for them and their families after release. Bringing attention to their cases will require significant effort. One somewhat reassuring factor is that, at least temporarily, the regime may refrain from further arrests – as long as relatively warm relations between Minsk and Washington persist. Will there be a thaw in relations between Poland, the Baltic states, and the EU on the one hand, and Belarus on the other? It is difficult to say, although pressure from the United States may increase. Not much may change, however, given the hostile intentions of both Russia and Belarus. Their willingness to engage stems primarily from economic difficulties, Lukashenko’s desire to retain power, and a broader ambition to return to the international political stage. Do the Americans have a coherent strategy and clearly defined goals? There are reasons to doubt this when observing Washington’s policy. It is also difficult to attribute good intentions to Minsk and Moscow. Nevertheless, the release of any political prisoner is a development to be welcomed.