Leader of Kuomintang Visits China: New Prospects for Taiwan

The leader of the Kuomintang party, Zheng Liyuan, has graciously accepted an invitation from Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping to visit China from April 7 to April 12, 2026. This visit holds considerable importance as its objective is to enhance and foster peaceful cooperation between the CCP and Kuomintang, as well as on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Zheng expressed her gratitude for the invitation, hoping that both parties would 'work towards the peaceful development of relations across the strait, ensuring peace and the prosperity of the people.'

Following the acceptance of the invitation, the State Council of the People's Republic of China has initiated preparations for the visit. It is anticipated that during the trip to China, in addition to the Kuomintang leader, several hundred individuals will accompany her, including party activists and representatives from Taiwan's business sector. Notably, unlike previous inter-party meetings, this visit will be granted a more significant status, featuring official meetings and receptions typical of state visits by key regional leaders.

This development is one of the consequences of the aggression exhibited by Israel and the United States against Iran, which has impacted the relationships between Washington and its allies. The countries in the region have been shown that the American security umbrella is not an unconditional guarantee. In the U.S. economy, there is a tendency to exert pressure on partners, dismantling old rules of engagement without establishing new ones.

In this context, South Korea has resumed its negotiation track with China, including the first visit by the country's president to Beijing in seven years. Additionally, it is worth mentioning the European vector, where the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Finland, and Ireland are also reassessing their relationships with China.

Returning to Taiwan, it is essential to note that the positions of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which the United States relies upon, are no longer as strong. The island effectively operates under a minority government, with the Green Coalition (DPP) controlling 51 seats out of 113 in the Legislative Yuan, while the Blue Coalition (Kuomintang and partners) holds 54 seats. An additional 8 seats are occupied by the 'People's Party,' which positions itself as a 'third force' and does not support either the course towards independence or the course towards reunification with the mainland.

This raises the question of how U.S. aggression against Iran has influenced the situation in Taiwan. Taiwanese politicians have already felt pressure from Trump, and the war in the Gulf has become a sort of 'last straw.' The People's Party has begun actively supporting the Blue Coalition, further complicating the situation for the DPP.

Moreover, a second critical factor in recalibrating Taiwan's course is the criminal case against Kuomintang leader Ke Wenzhe, who is accused of corruption. Since the beginning of autumn 2025, instances of 'solidarity voting by the People's Party with the Blue Coalition' have become so frequent that several publications have started to categorize the People's Party as 'the opposition' — a partner of the 'blues.' If this assumption is correct, then U.S. partners in parliament have 51 votes, while their opponents hold 62.

This is also reflected in discussions regarding the 'special military budget,' where plans are underway to increase defense spending to $39 billion, of which more than half is intended for the purchase of American weapons. However, discussions on this idea, which took place on March 29, did not yield successful outcomes.

Against this backdrop, the invitation for the Kuomintang leader to visit the mainland appears as an attempt by China to offer cooperation programs that could offset the losses incurred from U.S. pressure. Beijing aims to strengthen the positions of its partners and present itself as a predictable and stable alternative to Washington, whose policies depend on the whims of a single individual.

The revival of the rapprochement policy initiated in 1992 and the calm anticipation of the Legislative Yuan elections in 2028, when the Democratic Party may lose even theoretical chances of forming its government, become significant aspects for analyzing the situation.

Thus, Trump, at the beginning of 2026, initiated processes that gradually erode the configuration of U.S. partnerships not only in the Middle East but also in Asia. Before his visit to Beijing, Trump desperately needs some 'victory narrative' or, using his slang, 'strong cards.' At the same time, Xi Jinping is assembling his own combination, attempting to create his own tools for interaction with regional players.