Ukrainian Defense Forces Achieve Control Over Key Russian Western Ports

A military analyst, a former adviser to the Minister of Defense of Ukraine, and the coordinator of the Information Resistance group has reported that the Ukrainian Defense Forces have achieved control over all three major western ports of Russia. This success has been made possible through the coordinated efforts of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and other structures within the Ukrainian Defense Forces. Specifically, the ports in question are Primorsk and Ust-Luga, located on the Baltic Sea, along with the Sheskharis terminal in Novorossiysk on the Black Sea, which together account for approximately 60% of Russia's oil and petroleum product exports.

Additionally, it is important to note that the Kozmino port in the Far East is the only one that can rival these ports in scale, as it provides about 20% of the exports. Other ports, such as Vysotsk, Saint Petersburg, Taman, Tuapse, and Murmansk, contribute another roughly 20% to maritime exports. These ports are strategically vital to the Russian economy, and their protection has been planned at the highest levels.

During the period from March 22-23 to April 5-6, 2026, within just two weeks, the Ukrainian Defense Forces successfully breached Russian defenses at least seven times. This indicates a significant increase in Ukraine's capabilities for delivering long-range strikes compared to the capabilities of Russian air defense systems. The tactics employed by Ukrainian forces included initial strikes on Moscow, alongside attacks in Kuban and Crimea, followed by a shift in focus to the Leningrad region, which helped diminish the effectiveness of Russian air defenses.

Despite potential discussions regarding the damages incurred, it is evident that the restoration of some destroyed infrastructure, particularly tanks, will take anywhere from one month to a year. Preliminary estimates suggest that approximately 10% of oil volume was lost over the month, with an additional 20-30% lost over weeks, indicating the vast losses already being felt, and this is only in the context of the ports.

Throughout these two weeks, Ukrainian drones also struck significant petrochemical complexes, such as Kirishinefteorgsintez in the Leningrad region, a refinery in Ufa, and a Lukoil refinery near Nizhny Novgorod. These facilities are crucial to the Russian economy, as each produces specific products. For instance, Kirishi supplies fuel to the Baltic and Northern fleets of Russia, so any disruption in their operations could create serious vulnerabilities for Russian military command.

Strikes on refineries will lead to a shortage of refining capacities. Russia has already banned gasoline exports until July 31, except for intergovernmental contracts. The restrictions on crude oil exports, against the backdrop of increasing commodity volumes and the destruction of tanks, will inevitably lead to the necessity of shutting down wells, which will further complicate their recovery.

Moreover, Western partners, such as Sweden, have begun actively detaining Russian tankers, which also affects the situation. The Kremlin may expect that such dynamics of strikes will continue, and in three months, the western ports of Russia could be reduced to ruins.

It is quite likely that the topic of an 'energy truce' will resurface, but compared to last year, the situation has changed significantly. Ukraine's capabilities have increased markedly, so it is clear that merely an 'energy' truce will not be sufficient. This issue is likely to be a topic of discussion among American guests at the request of Russian partners after Easter.

This text is published with the author's permission.