Ukraine Has a Chance to ‘Join’ the EU in 2027

While remaining roadblocks are serious, with Budapest no longer planning a veto, Brussels may have a partial solution to expedite Ukraine’s path forward with a “symbolic” membership for Kyiv. Make us preferred on Google Share Facebook X (Twitter) LinkedIn Bluesky Email Copy Copied (Image by Depositphotos) Content Share Facebook X (Twitter) LinkedIn Bluesky Email Copy Copied Flip Make us preferred on Google Following the EU decision to grant Ukraine candidate status in 2022 and to greenlight the official opening of accession negotiations in 2024 – despite strong opposition from Hungary – Kyiv’s reform agenda has been mixed, with the Financial Times recently reporting that Paris and Berlin are considering granting Ukraine a “symbolic” membership without immediate voting rights or access to key parts of the bloc’s budget. To understand Ukraine’s EU accession prospects in full, Kyiv Post spoke to three Brussels-adjacent sources: Mykhailo Zhernakov of the DEJURE (Democracy Justice Reforms) Foundation, Iryna Sushko of Europe Without Barriers (EWB), and a diplomatic source in Brussels directly familiar with the negotiation process. Follow our coverage of the war on the @Kyivpost_official . To boost the reforms in Ukraine, described as sluggish, in December 2025, Ukrainian Vice Prime Minister Taras Kachka and EU Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos condensed the government-approved rule of law roadmap into 10 so-called “Kachka-Kos priorities.” The EU effectively endorsed this front-loading approach. These priorities include criminal justice amendments, ensuring NABU’s access to independent forensic examinations, involving international experts in the selection process for the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ), and adopting the Anti-Corruption Strategy and State Anti-Corruption Program, among others. Other Topics of Interest Ukraine Hits Key Russian Oil Facility Producing Urals Crude, Sparks Major Fire – Source Ukraine’s Security Service struck a Russian oil hub that produces Urals crude, damaging tanks and potentially disrupting exports, a source within the service reports. “This is the bare minimum required to achieve even a basic level of rule of law expected in countries where it is the norm,” Zhernakov told Kyiv Post. His DEJURE Foundation works on advancing judicial reform in Ukraine. “If we fail to do this, we will have no arguments against critics who say Ukraine is corrupt and lacks rule of law.” However, there is little room for optimism. “Unfortunately, there has been zero progress on this list over the past three and a half months since Dec. 11, when Ukraine undertook these commitments. These 10 points are meant to be completed within a year – not someday or never,” he said. He added that key institutions – including the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, and the State Bureau of Investigations – must be brought into a condition where they no longer obstruct reforms but instead support them. This assessment is supported by an independent report indicating that Ukraine scored just 9 out of 100 overall – and zero in some areas. Responsibility for progress ultimately lies with Kyiv. “The situation is often framed as a legislative crisis, but that’s misleading,” Zhernakov said. “The Verkhovna Rada has recently demonstrated its capability to act – 300+ votes on several bills, even constitutional majorities. The issue is not ability, but willingness to make certain critical decisions.” He points in particular to the need to restore international experts to the HQCJ selection commission. “The European Union clearly stated in its latest report on Ukraine that this must be done,” he said. Ukraine has already shown it can mobilize votes when needed. “Last summer, 311 Deputies voted to restore independence to NABU; the budget passed with 274 votes; and several recent bills received over 300 votes,” Zhernakov noted. The pessimistic outlook on reforms is somewhat offset by developments in Brussels and EU member states. One key shift is in Hungary, where Viktor Orbán – long seen as a Kremlin-friendly obstacle to Ukraine – has been replaced by Péter Magyar, a right-wing politician with a more favorable stance toward Kyiv. According to Kyiv Post’s diplomatic source in Brussels, the EU is still watching Magyar closely. He has already made statements that raised eyebrows, including opposition to the EU migration pact. Still, he is unlikely to engage in the kind of repeated veto threats and political brinkmanship that characterized his predecessor’s approach. More importantly, there is indeed a scenario under discussion, akin to the one reported by the FT, that could make Ukraine’s 2027 accession goal – previously seen as unrealistic – politically achievable. “This would mean the EU grants Ukraine political association, stating effectively that Ukraine is a member state politically while we continue fixing our reforms,” the source said. In such a scenario, membership would initially be more political than substantive. Ukraine would not immediately gain full access to key EU benefits such as the single market, free movement of workers, or the Schengen area, with negotiation clusters opening one by one – an undertaking that often takes several years of screening. While far from guaranteed, this approach is not impossible. Politically, it could offer a win-win: Kyiv gains symbolic victory and strategic anchoring in Europe, while member states can reassure their public that their economic interests remain protected. Furthermore, it aligns with the EU’s accession architecture, which allows for transitional periods – sometimes lasting up to seven years – before full integration, particularly regarding labor mobility – an issue which, according to Iryna Sushko of the migration-focused NGO Europe Without Barriers, Ukraine is already working on intensively, especially since the EU already hosts millions of Ukrainians of working age. “Ukrainian authorities have already raised this point. They argue that this can be used as an advantage, as an argument that such restrictions for Ukraine may not be necessary,” she told Kyiv Post, adding that “If any restrictions are introduced, they would likely take on a different meaning and be discussed differently compared to previous enlargement cases, because Ukraine’s situation is unique.” Still, whether the political association scenario comes to fruition likely depends less on reform progress and more on political momentum by the end of 2027, particularly following the presidential and legislative elections in France. With Emmanuel Macron unable to stand for a third term and right-wing tendencies remaining strong, Paris could either maintain its current Ukraine-friendly stance or shift course. For now, the main diplomatic focus in Brussels remains Kyiv’s urgent need for the EU to unblock the €90 billion ($106 billion) loan, which Magyar pledged to lift the block on once oil supplies via the Druzhba pipeline resume. Despite broad support for Ukraine’s EU aspirations, all three sources issue warnings. Zhernakov argues that lowering reform requirements would ultimately harm Ukrainians. “Ukrainian society overwhelmingly supports European integration – around 85% want Ukraine to join the EU. Moreover, 73% support stricter and clearer EU requirements on anti-corruption and rule of law,” he said. “Maintaining high standards is not punishment. It’s essential.” The diplomatic source in Brussels also cautioned against overestimating political unity within the EU, describing even political association in 2027 as “sounds too good to be true.” “There should be no illusions about member states,” the source said. “They will defend their interests.” They compared internal EU dynamics to Eurovision voting patterns – where neighboring countries consistently support one another regardless of performance. This is particularly true for Balkan states, which feel sidelined in the current enlargement process and tend to act as a bloc. Ukraine is widely seen as a major competitor to European producers, who have already staged large-scale protests across EU capitals, including Brussels. Meanwhile, Sushko notes that the main EU carrot for many Ukrainians – the EU labor market – is also a potential threat to Ukraine itself. “Some government officials emphasize that Ukraine itself may consider introducing certain restrictions, specifically to regulate the outflow of labor,” she said, adding that various surveys indicate that currently around 34–36% of Ukrainian citizens residing in the EU under different statuses are not ready to return. This concern was particularly emphasized in the EWB 2025 report “Transitional Periods on the Path to the Single Labor Market: Lessons for Ukraine” that showed that new member states anticipated an outflow of non-working populations, but instead lost a significant share of their economically active youth. For Ukraine, which already faces depopulation, high mortality, and low birth rates, this risk is a genuinely serious concern. Lesia Dubenko is a Ukrainian political scientist and analyst. A graduate of Lund University (MSc in European Affairs), she covers issues relating to international affairs, migration, and disinformation.