Інтерфакс-Україна

Religious Self-Identification of Ukrainians Remains Steady from 2022 to 2025, 50% Identify as Part of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine – KIIS

A recent nationwide survey conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) reveals that the religious self-identification of Ukrainian citizens has remained largely unchanged since July 2022, with 63% identifying as Orthodox.

The religious landscape in Ukraine has shown remarkable stability over the past few years, according to the findings of a nationwide survey released by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) on Tuesday. Conducted in the fall of 2025, the survey indicates that 63% of respondents consider themselves Orthodox Christians, a slight decline from previous years.

Among those surveyed, 50% identified themselves as belonging to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), while 9% classified themselves as Orthodox without specifying their jurisdiction. An additional 3% identified with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate). The survey also revealed that 16% of respondents labeled themselves as atheists, 6% as members of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC), 2% as Protestants, 1% as Roman Catholics, and 2% as part of other Christian denominations. Furthermore, 1% of respondents practiced Judaism, while 4% chose other options, and another 4% found it difficult to respond.

Comparing the data from 2020 to 2024, the percentage of those identifying as Orthodox ranged from 70% to 72%, indicating a decline to 63% in 2025. This downward trend is also evident among those identifying with the OCU, which saw an increase from 34% in 2020 to 56% in 2024, followed by a decrease. Similarly, the share of individuals identifying with the UOC (MP) rose to 18% in 2021 but has since stabilized at lower levels. The proportion of those identifying as UGCC members increased to 9% in 2021 before also experiencing a decline. The most significant drop was observed among those who considered themselves 'just Orthodox' without specifying jurisdiction, which fell from 22% to 7%, before rising again to 9%.

In contrast, the percentage of respondents identifying as atheists increased from 12% in 2024 to 16% in 2025, effectively doubling compared to the pre-2022 period, when it was around 7-8% in 2020-2021. In other categories, there were no statistically significant changes.

Regionally, the majority of respondents across all macro-regions identified as Orthodox, with most of these aligning with the OCU. However, there was a noticeable trend from west to east, with an increasing number of individuals identifying with the UOC (MP) and atheism—10% and 21%, respectively, in the eastern regions. Conversely, in the west, 19% identified with the UGCC, and 3% with the Roman Catholic Church, while in other macro-regions, the figures did not exceed 1%.

Age demographics revealed that among young people aged 18-29, the percentage of atheists and agnostics stood at 34%. This figure decreased to 19% among those aged 30-44, 16% among those aged 45-59, and 12% among individuals aged 60 and older.

Anton Grushetsky, the Executive Director of KIIS, noted that additional research indicates a relatively low level of religious awareness among Ukrainians. Many individuals struggle to understand the differences between the OCU and the UOC, leading them to choose the 'just Orthodox' option, which effectively serves as an equivalent to 'difficult to say' in situations of low information and low importance for respondents. He also pointed out a decline in trust towards the church among Ukrainians, with only a few respondents mentioning alleged oppression of the UOC (MP).

“We regularly ask questions about trust in institutions, and for example, in 2012, 62% trusted the church, which was the leader in trust among all institutions. By 2025, that figure had dropped to 44%, with 28% expressing distrust and another 28% having an uncertain stance. A third of young people identify as atheists or agnostics, and two-thirds of Orthodox Christians cannot name the difference between the UOC and the OCU. This indicates that the role of religion in the lives of many Ukrainians is not as profound as it may seem, and it likely has other, more secularized shades—such as in the context of Ukrainian national identity,” Grushetsky emphasized.

The survey was conducted from September 19 to October 5, 2025, using telephone interviews (CATI) across all government-controlled regions of Ukraine, with a sample of 2,015 respondents aged 18 and older. Under normal circumstances, the statistical error of the sample with a probability of 0.95, taking into account the design effect of 1.3, does not exceed 2.9%. However, due to the ongoing war, a certain systematic deviation is added to this formal error, yet the results maintain a high level of representativeness.