Four Years Ago, Russian Forces Conducted an Organized Retreat from Northern Ukraine

In March 2022, Russian forces executed an organized retreat from northern Ukraine, marking a significant turning point in the ongoing conflict. This retreat, which the Russians termed a 'gesture of goodwill,' was not a mere coincidence but rather the culmination of various factors indicating that the battle for Kyiv had been lost.

Firstly, by the second half of March 2022, it became evident that the Russian contingent lacked the strength to maintain adequate momentum for an offensive across all selected directions. This compelled the adversary to prioritize attempts to encircle Ukrainian forces in the eastern part of the country. The shortage of troops forced the enemy to withdraw from almost the entire Mykolaiv region, further confirming the overarching issue of resource scarcity and the necessity to prioritize actions amid limited mobilization efforts in Russia at that time.

Secondly, the situation in northern Ukraine, particularly in the Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy regions, was especially challenging for Russian troops. There was a notable lack of forces in proportion to the territories where combat operations were underway, as well as the stretched and vulnerable communications. In their attempts to encircle the main populated areas of the region, Russian troops themselves felt very uncertain—the question of who was encircling whom remained open.

In northern Ukraine, forces from the less powerful Eastern and Central military districts of Russia were operating. Attempts to hold the respective territories under such conditions, while Ukrainian forces were being reinforced, carried the risks of fragmentation, encirclement, and destruction of Russian troops. This could have occurred had the enemy decided to dig in and not retreat, similar to the tactics employed by Finnish forces in the center and north of the country during the Winter War of 1939-1940.

By March 25, 2022, the Russians announced a regrouping that effectively became a retreat. This process concluded quite rapidly and in an organized manner—by April 6, 2022. The battle for Kyiv became a vivid example of how achieving results does not always require the complete destruction of the enemy; sometimes, it is sufficient to create a dilemma for the adversary.

Of course, the ideal scenario would have been the complete annihilation of the forces from the Eastern and Central military districts, preventing them from exiting Ukrainian territory to reinforce the offensive in eastern Ukraine. However, this would have required a different quantity and quality of forces, which was not feasible at that time.

The text is published with the author's permission. The projects of the 'Come Back Alive' Foundation continue to work on supporting Ukrainian military personnel and providing assistance in wartime conditions.