A Ukrainian Senate: The History of a Bicameral Ukraine

The obstacles to a Ukrainian upper house of parliament have an interesting history. Make us preferred on Google Flip Share Facebook X (Twitter) LinkedIn Bluesky Email Copy Copied Photo by Verkhovna Rada Content Share Facebook X (Twitter) LinkedIn Bluesky Email Copy Copied Flip Make us preferred on Google Ukraine is an unusual country in having a large population, yet possessing a unicameral parliamentary structure in its single house, the Verkhovna Rada. Forty percent of the national members of the Venice Commission (the Council of Europe’s advisory body on constitutional matters) have a bicameral parliament and, of those with a single house parliament, almost all of them have a population of less than ten million. Ukraine is the exception alongside Turkey (population 85 million) and South Korea (52 million). Ukraine has a unicameral structure because of specific historical circumstances.  Ukraine’s unicameral structure, as a legacy of the Supreme Soviet, reflects a time when Ukraine was treated as a regional administrative centre in the Soviet Union. The movement to a bicameral system could not merely be an advancement of parliamentary procedures, but a significant symbolic step of Ukrainian statehood. The bicameral structure would reflect the historical, political, and cultural complexity of a large populous nation, like most bicameral systems.  Follow our coverage of the war on the @Kyivpost_official . The history of Ukrainian bicameralism The emergence of Ukraine from the Soviet Union carried with it the baggage of regional Soviet government. Ukraine was run by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) and this single chamber turned into the Verkhovna Rada (literally ‘Supreme Council’). Thus, from the start of modern independence, Ukraine had a historically unicameral system, more by a process of historical continuity and evolution than by decision from first principles. Other Topics of Interest Zelensky Proposes Legal Framework for Private Military Companies Ukraine plans to legalize private military companies, with officials preparing legislation aimed at creating jobs for veterans and expanding security exports. By 1998, President Leonid Kuchma was pushing for a bicameral system as a buffer between what would be a lower chamber of the legislature and the executive branch of government, one of the traditional roles of a second chamber. Like most such bodies in federated or populous states, this was to be composed of regional representatives. However, since local governors were appointed by the President, this immediately raised the spectre of an entire chamber composed of the President’s friends and cronies. Unsurprisingly, this was not popular and met considerable resistance. The bicameral ambition might have fizzled out if it had not been picked up by the Rada’s Chairman Olekasandr Tkachenko. He proposed a second chamber of regional representatives, but they would be elected. However, this proposal also met with resistance because the strength of left-wing politicians in many of the regions led to a concern that the chamber would be highly politically skewed.  In any second chamber made up of regional representatives there is always the risk that it will become dominated by the political fashions of the time, just as the US Senate moves back and forth between Democrats and Republicans. This need not destabilise a state so long as the checks and balances on power are robust. However, it was a concern in a Ukraine trying to extricate itself from 70 years of communism. It was perhaps understandable that it caused nervousness. The idea of a Ukrainian Senate surfaced again in draft constitutional amendments drawn up by President Viktor Yushchenko and submitted to the Venice Commission (CDL-AD(2009)024) for comment in 2009. There were similar drafts drawn up by other blocs. In the draft considered by the Venice Commission, the Ukrainian Senate was to have senators elected on a regional basis with three senators per oblast, including cities such as Kyiv with a similar status as an oblast. One third of the senate was to be elected every two years.  In addition to its legislative function, the Senate was to play a role in appointing important state positions. It must be said that the Venice Commission was rather lukewarm: “All in all, the expected benefits and possible disadvantages of a second chamber should be carefully weighed against each other,” it concluded. However, this was hardly controversial advice.  For a fleeting moment, a Ukrainian Senate emerged from the constitutional mist (it should be noted that in 1918 there was a State Senate, but this was the highest judicial body of the Ukrainian State, not a second legislative chamber in the meaning used here). However, the election of President Viktor Yanukovych in 2010 caused a rapid change in the constitutional temper. He tilted Ukraine towards heightened presidential powers and reverted the constitution back to its 1996 form, and, along with it, its explicit unicameralism.  Following the Euromaiden protests, after which Yanukovych fled, the 2004 Constitution with its weakened presidential powers was re-instated in 2014, but the unicameral system came with it. After 2014, debates on anti-corruption, membership of the EU, and other matters, dominated the political landscape. Of course, since 2022, the full-scale Russian invasion has placed the unicameral-bicameral debate into the shadows.  In summary, after independence, the idea of a second chamber in parliament stalled either because of concerns about the mechanism of election or, even given fair elections, worries about its impartial composition. Then, in later years, it got ignored as larger scale political changes swamped parliament. Indeed, had Yanukovych not been elected and the Venice Commission draft Constitution adopted, Ukraine would likely now have a Senate.  One of the interesting aspects of this history of bicameralism in Ukraine is that at no point has the idea of a bicameral Ukraine been explicitly rejected after thorough consideration of the principles of bicameralism itself, at least not at the state level. The debate about it has, for one reason or another, got swept away by other developments.  Overcoming the history: a bicameral Ukraine The history of the bicameral idea in Ukraine could provide some direction on how a Senate might be constituted.  The late 1990s concept of a Senate elected by regional representation was similar to many second chambers around the world that reflect the regions, or states in federated nations. In this case, part of the chamber could be comprised of three senators from each of Ukraine’s administrative regions as was proposed by the Venice Commission in 2009.  If the concern of the late 1990s persists that this chamber would become another political battlefield of regional disagreements, destabilising the state, then the regional representation could be reduced (for example, two senators per administrative region), and the remainder of the Senate be constituted more like the second chamber in Canada or the UK, in which representation is based on the rich social tapestry of the nation. To avoid the domination of presidential appointments, and the legitimate concerns that have arisen from the Yanukovych years, this segment of the Senate could be a mixed format, with some presidential appointments and other senators voted by direct election or public nomination. This procedure would allay fears that such a house would become controlled by the President, threatening the return of over-zealous presidential powers that led to the constitutional crises of the 2010s. Through such a structure, the Ukrainian Senate would act as a consultative mechanism in legislation and as a means for consensus building across diverse communities and interests disconnected from party feuds, two of the recognised strengths of bicameralism.  The full-scale invasion has necessarily relegated the discussion of a Ukrainian Senate, let alone many other constitutional discussions, to a lower urgency against defence needs and national organization. However, ironically, by strengthening and consolidating a sense of national purpose, unity, and direction for the state, it has greatly enhanced the potential benefits of a bicameral structure, when the time eventually comes to consider constitutional reform.  Charles Cockell is Professor of Astrobiology at the University of Edinburgh.  The views expressed are the author’s and not necessarily of Kyiv Post.