Why unilaterally surrendering Donetsk Oblast equals strategic and military suicide for Ukraine

A soldier from a Ukrainian 2S22 Bohdana 155 mm self-propelled howitzer crew walks along a trench at a position in the Pokrovsky front-line section, Donetsk Oblast, on Jan. 23, 2026. (Dmytro Smolienko/Ukrinform/NurPhoto via Getty Images) Prefer on Google Mykola Bielieskov Research fellow at the National Institute for Strategic Studies As the Trump peace process in the Ukraine–Russia war evolved throughout 2025, the Kremlin introduced the idea that a unilateral withdrawal by Ukrainian forces from the north-west of the Donetsk Oblast was a key prerequisite for a ceasefire and settlement. The Kremlin framed the issue as a relatively minor concession, worthy of the noble goal of ending hostilities. Donald Trump largely swallowed this Russian bait. The success of Moscow's strategy is evident in how the White House has cast Volodymyr Zelensky 's consistent defense of Ukraine's national interests as a major obstacle to peace. Zelensky has rejected all such demands. The Ukrainian president has simply no legal authority to cede Ukrainian territory. Moreover, politically, it would be a highly controversial idea. According to the most recent Kyiv International Institute for Sociology survey , 68% of Ukrainians were not ready to surrender the north-west of Donetsk Oblast when told that related U.S. security commitments might be vague at best. The political risks in Ukraine are, for sure, important, but surrendering Donetsk Oblast to Russia is first and foremost problematic both militarily and strategically. Today, the fortified Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration forms the core of Ukraine's defense system. Five Ukrainian corps (the 3rd, 11th, and 19th of the Land Forces, the 1st of the National Guard, and the 7th Paratroopers) defend a front that stretches from the outskirts of Lyman to the outskirts of Pokrovsk. If Ukraine were to withdraw from the area, this would leave the nearby Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts extremely vulnerable, with no comparable major urban areas to anchor Ukrainian defenses. In military terms, the nearby flatlands and minor towns would be more vulnerable to the infiltration tactics practiced by Russia . The area of Donetsk Oblast under Ukrainian control cannot be easily bypassed or outflanked by Russian forces . This makes Russia pursue a costly attritional campaign, giving Ukraine the upper hand as the ongoing war favors defensive modes of operation. The battlefield is saturated with reconnaissance and strike UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles), forcing Russia to rely on dispersed infantry and infiltration tactics. This means that classic deep offensive operations involving rapid penetration and exploitation are as far away now as they were in 2024 and 2025. Ukrainian servicemen of the mobile fire group of the anti-aircraft missile and artillery battery of the 23rd Separate Mechanized Brigade work on pickup truck with the M2 Browning machine gun, equipped with special sighting systems, on May 21, 2025 in Donetsk Oblast, Ukraine. (Oxana Chorna/Global Images Ukraine via Getty Images) Reliance on dispersed infantry using infiltration tactics instead imposes severe limits on the tempo and scale of operations. Moreover, both around Kupiansk in December 2025 and in the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast in February 2026, Ukraine's defense forces successfully counterattacked Russian forces before they could consolidate positions, using UAV interdiction and assault forces. At the same time, the improved Ukrainian middle-strike campaign (ranging from 20 to 200 km, or 12-144 miles) will impose additional costs on Russian forces as the 2026 campaign intensifies. All the above does not mean there will be no Russian advances in 2026 at all. Front-line dynamics will probably involve " neither major Russian breakthrough nor full stabilization ." Ukraine will probably continue its strategy of "trading space for maximum Russian losses," as it did in 2024 and 2025. The likelihood that Ukraine might eventually lose the north-western part of Donetsk Oblast through intense combat does not warrant the immediate surrender of these territories. Using current technologies, tactics, and manpower, it would take Russia until the end of 2027 to fully occupy the north-west of the Donetsk Oblast, with a bloody bill attached. Russia is currently losing an average of approximately 30,000 dead or seriously wounded every month. Surrendering territory without a fight before Russian forces are permanently exhausted would just be an invitation to further Russian advances, while Ukrainian defenses would be based in less advantageous positions. Giving territory to a bully has never worked, and strategic history is unambiguous on this. When the Soviet Union demanded Finland surrender the Karelian Isthmus in 1939, Finland refused — and fought two major wars rather than capitulate. Though Finland ultimately lost the territory, its fierce resistance inflicted devastating Soviet casualties, convincing Moscow that a free Finland was preferable to a conquered one. Had Finland conceded without a fight, it might have shared the fate of the Baltic states, swallowed up by the Soviet Union by 1940. Russian demands to unilaterally surrender the north-west of the Donetsk Oblast are just another example of the Kremlin masking its combat ineptitude while trying to take one step closer to the goal of Ukrainian subjugation. Russia's claim that Ukraine should make territorial concessions now because Russia will eventually conquer it overlooks the nuances described above. Along with deep strikes targeting Russia's oil processing and military industrial complex, and actions against the Russian shadow fleet , staunch active defense of the north-west of the Donetsk Oblast is an integral part of the Ukrainian strategy to inflict maximum damage, pose new dilemmas for Russian decision making, and create the conditions for a durable peace . Editor's note: This op-ed is based on the commentary first published at the European Policy Institute in Kyiv. The opinions expressed in the op-ed section are those of the authors and do not purport to reflect the views of the Kyiv Independent. Mykola Bielieskov is a research fellow at the National Institute for Strategic Studies and a senior analyst at the Ukrainian NGO “Come Back Alive.”