Myth That Has Lasted Too Long

Who protects whom: Europe, America, and the lessons of war from Ukraine Make us preferred on Google Flip Share Facebook X (Twitter) LinkedIn Bluesky Email Copy Copied Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky gestures as he delivers a press conference with Secretary General of NATO following their meeting in Kyiv on Feb. 3, 2026, amid the Russian invasion in Ukraine. (Photo by Genya SAVILOV / AFP) Content Share Facebook X (Twitter) LinkedIn Bluesky Email Copy Copied Flip Make us preferred on Google In the political imagination that has spread in recent years from parts of the American scene – particularly under the banner of “America First” – Europe is often portrayed as a spoiled ally: wealthy, yet security-dependent, condemned to purchase American weapons and seek protection under someone else’s security umbrella. It is a simple, easily digestible, and politically useful image. The problem is that it is increasingly detached from reality. Follow our coverage of the war on the @Kyivpost_official . Paradoxically, the war in Ukraine has done more to dismantle this myth than any conference or strategic document. Not because Europe has overnight become a military superpower, but because the war has laid bare the essence of the issue: Europe is not weak – it has simply been comfortable for too long. Ukrainian reality has forced it to wake up. Within that awakening lies the answer to a question often posed in Washington: can Europe manage without America? Yet the real question should be framed differently – does Europe want to be able to manage without America? The distinction between inability and unwillingness is fundamental, yet it is deliberately blurred in political narratives. When discussing Europe’s security dependence, the American nuclear umbrella is often cited as the key argument. And indeed, for decades it formed the backbone of deterrence on the continent. However, the picture is no longer so simple. Other Topics of Interest Putin Claims War ‘Coming to an End’ and Offers to Meet Zelensky in Moscow Following the May 9 parade, Vladimir Putin asserted that the “conflict in Ukraine is moving toward its end” while repeating several controversial claims regarding the war’s history and potential resolution. Putin stated he is willing to meet President Volodymyr Zelensky in Moscow or a third country, though he specified that a meeting in a neutral location would only occur to sign a final agreement. France and the United Kingdom together possess a nuclear arsenal more than sufficient to deter any rational adversary from attacking European soil. This does not represent global parity with the United States, but it is a serious and credible deterrent. What is lacking is not capability, but political architecture. European nuclear deterrence exists, yet it is not institutionalized as a common policy. At present, deterrence is distributed, nationally controlled, and politically fragmented. In essence, Europe possesses the instruments, but it still lacks the orchestra. One of the most persistent misconceptions is that Europe invests too little in its own security. That may have been true ten or fifteen years ago, but it is no longer the case. European states collectively spend hundreds of billions of dollars annually on defense – more than Russia and China combined. In theory, this level of investment should enable full strategic autonomy. Yet autonomy remains elusive. The reason lies not in the amount of money, but in how it is spent. Europe’s security landscape is still characterized by parallel systems, duplicated capabilities, and slow political coordination. Twenty-seven states still do not think or act as one. In times of crisis, speed of decision-making often matters more than aggregate strength – and this is precisely where Europe lags behind. However, what is changing is the awareness of this problem. For the first time since the Cold War, European governments are no longer debating whether to increase defense budgets, but how to most effectively convert them into operational power. That is the essential difference today. If there is one event that has transformed Europe’s security paradigm, it is the war in Ukraine. Not because it introduced entirely new technologies, but because it demonstrated how old and new technologies collide in real time. Ukraine has become something no military doctrine can replace: a living laboratory of modern warfare. On that front, concepts long debated in theory by Western armed forces are being tested daily in practice. From the mass use of drones, to the digital integration of units, to the brutal reality of artillery warfare – Ukraine has fused the past and the future of war into a single, chaotic system. But most important is the speed of adaptation. While many defense departments are accustomed to lengthy modernization cycles, Ukraine has been forced to innovate on the move. Systems operating at the front today often did not exist six months ago. This ability to learn under pressure has become a decisive advantage. And while Ukraine pays for these lessons in blood, Europe gains invaluable experience that even the most powerful nations do not possess. In this context, the relationship between Europe and Ukraine is evolving into something far deeper than traditional aid. It is no longer a simple donor–recipient dynamic, but a strategic partnership based on exchange. Europe provides Ukraine with resources, technology, and political support. Ukraine, in turn, offers Europe what it lacks most: real-world experience of contemporary warfare, tested under the harshest conditions. This exchange is not always visible at first glance, but its effects are profound. European militaries are no longer planning future conflicts based on theoretical scenarios, but on concrete lessons from Ukraine. Industry is adapting to the real needs of the battlefield, while political decisions increasingly reflect the understanding that war is no longer an abstract possibility. In practical terms, Europe is financing its own security while learning it on the Ukrainian front. In light of these developments, the narrative of a “weak Europe” enters a clear contradiction. If Europe is truly powerless, why does it remain the central pillar of Western security? Why do American military structures still depend so heavily on European infrastructure, bases, and political support? The answer is simple and lies in the political function of such a narrative. It does not describe reality – it seeks to shape it. By portraying Europe as dependent, the MAGA narrative justifies American leadership and sustains a structure of relations rooted in the Cold War. But reality is changing. Europe today is not what it was ten years ago. It cannot yet be described as fully autonomous, but it is no longer passive. It is in transition between two models – the old one, in which security was delegated, and a new one, in which security is gradually being assumed. Despite all progress, there remain elements that Europe cannot easily replace. These are primarily capabilities developed over decades within the American system: global logistics, satellite dominance, and the speed of strategic decision-making. Perhaps even more important is what is less visible – the political will to integrate these capabilities. Without it, even the most advanced systems remain fragmented. Here again, Ukraine plays a critical role. The war on its territory does not allow Europe the luxury of delaying decisions. Each day of conflict is a reminder that security is not a theoretical concept, but a matter of survival. Perhaps the greatest irony of the situation is that external pressure has accelerated Europe’s awakening – including pressure from the United States. Demands for higher spending, threats of withdrawal, and political tensions have forced European leaders to reassess long-standing assumptions. The result of this process is not a weaker Europe that is even more dependent on America. On the contrary – it is a continent that is slowly but persistently building its own strategic autonomy. This does not mean the end of the alliance. It means its transformation. In this emerging security architecture, Europe and Ukraine are becoming mutually indispensable. Neither can fully achieve its objectives without the other. Europe without Ukraine lacks its most important source of modern combat experience. Ukraine without Europe lacks the resources necessary for long-term defense and reconstruction. Together, however, they form a system with the potential to redefine security on the European continent. This system intertwines acquired knowledge with adapted resources, gradually blurring the line between front and rear. Ultimately, what is collapsing is not just a single myth, but an entire way of thinking. The idea that Europe is permanently dependent on American protection is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain in the face of reality. This does not mean that Europe will become fully independent overnight. But it does mean that the process has already begun – and cannot be stopped without a fundamental shift in political direction. In that process, Ukraine is not a periphery of Europe’s security architecture. It is its epicenter. While debates about budgets and strategies continue in political centers of power, the future of warfare is already being shaped on the Ukrainian front. And that future leaves little room for illusions. Perhaps the most accurate way to put it is this: Europe is no longer learning how to live in peace, but how to defend itself and survive war. And in that school, Ukraine is not the student. It is the teacher. The views expressed in this article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post. Nikola Lunić is a Serbian geopolitical and security analyst and Retired Navy Captain. He previously served as Serbia’s DefenSe Attaché in London and as Executive Director of the Council for Strategic Policy. He is currently a Strategic Affairs Consultant and a regular guest lecturer at the Faculty of Law, University of Osijek.