Drone Domination, A New Way to Blow Up a Bridge, Recruiting Blues

Stefan Korshak, Kyiv Post’s military correspondent, shares his perspective on recent developments in Russia’s war in Ukraine. Make us preferred on Google Share Facebook X (Twitter) LinkedIn Bluesky Email Copy Copied Sniper, 18th Sloviansk Brigade, Thursday, eastern front (Image by unit) Content Share Facebook X (Twitter) LinkedIn Bluesky Email Copy Copied Flip Make us preferred on Google Drones dominated the week. Thankfully, the Americans are distracted by Iran and so we have had a break from “peacemaking” in the Russo-Ukraine War. Without question, the big news this week on the front is that the Russians have widely confirmed what we were hearing bits and pieces of from the Ukrainian side for a couple of weeks now: Right now on the battlefield level, the Ukrainians have a powerful drone advantage, this is numbers AND quality. Follow our coverage of the war on the @Kyivpost_official . USF drone on final approach to strike on radar system for Russian S-400 “best in the world” air defense system. Feodosia, Saturday. (Image is a USF video screen grab.) There is still some debate on the details but in general the Russians are complaining that Ukrainian drones are flying about twice as deeply into the Russian rear area as before, their overall numbers have doubled, the drones often are silent until the final attack, the drones are not picked up on practically all Russian electronics detection gear, and the drones seem very resistant to jamming. Details on the Ukrainian drone advantage, now I would say confirmed, are here . Along the line, the situation seems largely unchanged, but with small Ukrainian advances in several sectors and small Russian advances in a few. Other Topics of Interest Easter Prisoner Exchange – What It Was Like and What It Could Have Been Exclusive report by Kyiv Post from the prisoner exchange on April 11 – and why it was not as expected Russian "mechanized" attack in progress, refurbished T-62 tank and a "Bukhanka" UAZ microbus. (Image from Friday, source is watermark) On Sunday, the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) cleared the village of Novopidhorodne in house-to-house fighting. On Tuesday, there are reports that they entered the village of Nikiforivka, this on the Kramatorsk axis. On Wednesday, AFU units were spotted moving in Fedeivka Druha and Lipivka; this is more or less on the M03 to Sloviansk. On Friday, reports appeared that Russian forces have captured the village of Berestok, Kostyantynivka sector. The impression is more Ukrainian activity and progress, but that may be driven by reports available rather than the real situation. On Monday, AFU units captured the village of Ambarne with the 129th Mech Brigade getting credit. This information is from the drone unit Ravens. There was a report that Russia’s 71st Motorized Rifle Division transferred to Vovchansk; whether this is to increase pressure or hold the Ukrainians back is not clear. Russians reported pushing into the village of Pischane, on Wednesday. On Friday, reports showed up that the 9th USF Brigade (formerly “Vinnytsia Scythians,” 59th Brigade) deployed to Kupyansk. I’ve included a publicity photo of Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrsky during a frontline visit, note that Robert Brovdi, Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) troops’ commander, is with him. This is modern war; you have the army commander visiting, what I assume is a corps/brigade HQ – he has the USF troops commander in tow, and they together decide resources for future fighting. From a Cold War perspective, Syrsky and the AFU are treating drone brigades very much like 20th-century artillery brigades. It is astounding to me that other armies don’t do this also. But they will. General Oleksandr Sysky talks planning with the SBS commander Robert Brovdi next to him (Image by ZSU, Thursday, Pokrovsk sector) More Ukrainian progress around Stepanohirsk, but details are limited. Reportedly, the 5th Assault Brigade was transferred somewhere near Huliaipole. This brings up another Syrsky-related point. In an interview on Tuesday, he claimed the AFU had taken away the initiative from Russia and that the AFU is dictating the pace of combat on the line. I’m not positive about that, but we are seeing very solid evidence of AFU leadership now maneuvering and deploying battalions (Yes, I know it’s called a brigade. In the AFU to translate field strength to NATO peacetime strength, give the unit you’re talking about a 66% haircut and you’ll be close). Reportedly, the 76th Rocket and Artillery Brigade deployed here; this is consistent with the observed Russian strategy of trying to make Ukrainian border regions unlivable. This is a pretty good graphic showing how the Ukrainians have upped their game hunting Russian air defense systems, my numbers are a little different but the trend matches. (Image by Ken Ryle Monday) Another week of intense operations. Historically, we are witnessing the still-slow but nevertheless relentless demolition of a major state’s capacity to fight a war by a state one-quarter its size. If you don’t feel like reading this section closely, the main point is: This isn’t a one-off; think week after week after week, that’s what’s happening. On Sunday, Ukraine launched at least 238 drones and possibly 250+ in one of the biggest air/sea attacks of the war (so far): Novorossiysk oil-loading facilities Sunday-Monday, Ukrainian sea and air drones attack Novorossiysk, this was one of the biggest naval port raids of the entire war, note purple searchlights (Russian internet) The precursor here we saw last weekend, with air and sea drone activity around Kerch, Taman, the south end of Crimea, and the Krasnodar shore, for two nights running, there were reports of Ukrainian kamikaze boats out on the water doing something, air drones popping in and out of observation around airfields, etc. Some air defense stuff got attacked at Kacha and Saki airfields. Be-12. You take your kills where you can get them, I guess. Destroyed in Ukrainian drone raid on Kacha overnight Sunday-Monday. My working theory was that it LOOKED like maybe there was going to be an attempt at a strike at Kerch Bridge, but it was obvious enough that it might have been a distraction. All that was clear was that the Ukrainians were definitely up to something. One of two drone waves that went south on Sunday-Monday. (Graphic sourc per watermark) This became clear overnight Sunday and Monday (April 4, 5) with a big, multi-means attack on Novorossiysk. The main objective appears to have been to take the Shekharsis oil loading terminal offline. This was successful. And as a result, as the smoke cleared on Monday morning, technically 70% – you read that right – of Russia’s crude oil export capacity by sea was dead. This is because the damage to the Baltic export terminals, which had been the USF forces’ big project last week, wasn’t repaired, and with the main terminal at Novorossiysk still burning, that left only ports on the Pacific. FIRMS, Monday, Novorossiysk (Image is screen grab from NASA imagery) A detailed run-down of how the operation went, air defenses suppressed ahead of time, what exactly got hit, entertaining contradictions between official Russian statements saying everything is under control, don’t panic, and at times quite emotional and panicked Russian internet is here . As to implications, although if given the chance, the Russians will certainly repair the damage, this is already very bad, war-influencing news for the Kremlin. If the Ukrainians can knock that much Russian oil export capacity offline once, then trends are they can and will do it again. Novorossiysk Russian Navy frigate In the same attack, on Sunday, besides tearing up the oil-loading capacity, the Ukrainians sent at least one drone at the frigate Admiral Makarok – which can carry eight cruise missiles and bombards Ukraine regularly – and from the video achieved at least a single hit to the bridge. The video is not conclusive: It was definitely the Admiral Makarov, and definitely a drone came near its bridge, but the video cuts off, so we can’t be sure. Apparently, this ship has been hit twice before over the years, once by a Neptune. Admiral Grigorevich, a “secondary” (!) target at Novorossiysk (Image sourcing per watermark, SBS forces) The real implication here is the geography. Unless the Russians cut her into pieces, the Admiral Makarov is too big to escape up the Volga River, and Novorossiysk was the naval port that the Russian navy warships escaped to, after the Ukrainians made Sevastopol untenable back in October 2023. The Black Sea is only so big; the bigger Russian warships there have nowhere to escape to. Even Abkhazia is clearly in range of the Ukrainian drones. Also on Sunday, about 80 kilometers (50 miles) offshore of Crimea. Most readers will be familiar with this platform, but for those of you who are not, this is a sizable drilling rig where work was stopped probably a decade ago, but when the second invasion happened, the Russians started using it as a platform for air defense systems, early warning systems, and a base for small patrol boats. The Ukrainians have hit it repeatedly and at least one time landed commandos on it. British air recon was sniffing around Crimea on Friday. (Source in watermark) Pretty much at the same time all the commotion was going on 200 kilometers (124 miles) to the east around Novorossiysk, a squadron of Ukrainian robot boats attacked the platform, blew themselves up against some of the platform legs, and launched FPV drones to hit the upper parts of the platform. Yes, you read that right, technically speaking, the Ukrainians are now operating sea drone aircraft carriers. This, at least in part, was the work, apparently, of the 413th separate USF regiment “Raid.” Along with that, if you believe the Ukrainian navy, which put out the video, a pair of fairly modern Swedish anti-ship missiles, named Gungnir a/k/a Odin’s Spear (formally: Swedish RBS-15 Mk.III/IV), launched from the shore also hit the platform, at the same time, the sea drones were attacking it. As with the “hit” vs. the Admiral Makarov, a single video is not always hard proof; in this case, the navy showed us a pair of launches from the Swedish system, and a pair of explosions visibly on the platform. Probably it happened like the Ukrainians say it did, but we’re going to have to wait for more evidence before we can say we’re sure. Also on Sunday, in the vicinity of the Kerch strait, a “drone” struck, hit, damaged and set afire the Volgo-Balt 138, a 3,000-ton general cargo ship usually used to ship grain from a small regional port to a larger international port where the grain is collected and sent abroad on a big carrier. The Ukrainians consider ships like this fair game because a portion of the grain Russia exports via the Black Sea comes from Ukrainian regions occupied by Russia, which the Ukrainians see as theft and piracy. For the record, Russian media called it a “terrorist attack.” Three crew died and nine were injured in the strike and subsequent fire. The survivors abandoned ship, made their way to Kerch, and in due course the local authorities sent out a tug to try and bring the ship, now drifting, back into port. This failed, and the ship sank. That was all just one Sunday. If someone tells you Ukraine is losing, tell that someone about April 5, 2026. If you want a textbook example of a complex, multi-faceted, tri-dimensional Ukrainian strike operation that required very precise timing and weeks of preparation, that night was one for the history books. Tuesday – Yet more strikes vs. Ust-Luga in the Baltic, raising the attack count against that particular facility to six in the past ten days. Wednesday – HUR special forces use anti-ship drones to hit, and according to them, put out of action for good the last railcar-capable ferry left in the Kerch region, a ship called the Slavyanin. According to HUR, it sank, according to Russian milbloggers, it was “damaged somewhat.” No more rail ferries from Kerch to Russia mainland. Wednesday HUR. This is a logistically critical ship because if the Kerch bridge were to stop existing, then it is only by ships like the Slavyanin that Russia could move heavy freight, by sea, from the Russian mainland into Crimea. I think it should be evident, but it’s worth repeating, that sea logistics are life or death for Russia’s hold on Crimea, because the other route into the peninsula – by land via the Tavria steppe westwards from Mariupol and then south – is fully within the range of Ukrainian drones, and the railroad has been hit so often that when the Russians try to run a train along it the result is more than a little like a shooting gallery. Shooting the archer – This week, we saw the Ukrainians hit a missile frigate (noted above), a Shahed launch operation in Crimea (Monday), and (another) Bastion heavy rocket launcher on Wednesday, which was in the vicinity of Sofiievka. Shoot the archer not the arrow, Shahed launcher in Crimea gets taken out, Monday, April 6, 2026 (Image sourcing per watermark, SBS forces) Friday – This may have been another intense flight operations day, but details are still coming in. The high point, not confirmed, may have been Neptune strikes in the Bryansk region, in the vicinity of Yurasovo village, target unclear. In the Volgograd region, an oil pumping station feeding the Shekhsaris oil refinery, that hit last week, was set on fire. Substantial explosions in Luhansk, at some kind of military base. Also reports of drone activity, air defense busy, possible strikes in the Rostov and Kazan regions. But it may also be just feeling out Russian air defenses. Confirmed was a strike on the oil rigs on the Caspian by which Russia ships mostly refined products to western Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and I assume the Tehran market. Also on Friday, you decide if it was linked, the RAF flew a Rivet Joint KC-135 reconnaissance mission deep over the Black Sea, pushing Russia-controlled airspace over Crimea. Three important developments, otherwise it’s been the standard 100-200 Shaheds a night targeting mostly civilians in what looks like a terror campaign, but some energy infrastructure is still being attacked. Besides that: 1. President Volodymyr Zelensky on Friday told a Western reporter the US is still sending Ukraine PAC-3 missiles for Patriot. He didn’t say how many, but given the US air defense mess in the Gulf, this is either good news or proof that Pentagon supply and munitions reserves networks don’t react in weeks, but in months. If PAC-3 is still being delivered two months from now, it will mean that the pro-Ukraine insurgents in the Pentagon have figured out a way to keep the PAC-3 missiles coming behind Secretary of War Pete Hegseth’s back. 2. No big Russian missile strike in a week, nor has there been any obvious evidence (bombers moving, transports flying into bomber airfields, etc.) that one is being prepared. 3. With improving weather, shorter-range Russian drones very clearly are hunting civilians and looking to kill and wound them. Following the April 4 open-air market strike in Nikopol that killed five and injured 19, on Wednesday, the Russians attacked a bus in Nikopol, killing four and injuring 16. Another bus was hit, but no one was killed. One of the myths the Russo-Ukraine War has busted is the idea that super-accurate, super-expensive, super-NATO weapons get you exactly what you want on the battlefield at the push of a button, just like in video games. One of the best lessons along these lines has been Ukrainian road bridges whose reinforced concrete, Soviet-era construction had proved really resilient to HIMARS and Smerch rockets, and even smaller air-dropped bombs. According to the Telegraph, down in the Kherson sector, some Ukrainian marines were sitting around thinking about how to knock down a bridge the Russians were using to supply troops on the left/south bank of the Dnipro River, in the vicinity of Kherson. The bridge itself is (was) a four-lane crossing of a river paralleling the Dnipro on the Russian side. The name of the parallel river is the Konka; some of you who are veterans of the Dnipro bridgehead operation in 2024 may remember it. HIMARS rockets hit the bridge repeatedly, but mostly just blew manhole-sized holes in the surface. Since this was right on the front and bridges are pretty much always protected with air defenses, calling in the Ukrainian air force wasn’t an easy solution; to hit the bridge there would have to be a big campaign suppressing the Russian anti-aircraft systems, finding out where their jammers were and hitting them, and even then the Ukrainian air force doesn’t have unlimited precision-guided bombs and pretty much never is there a bomb like that to hit a target a single marine brigade wants to hit, just to make Russian movement in the area more difficult. The marines thought about it, no doubt pulled strings and messaged buddies in Kyiv, or more exactly, someone decided this was a job for 426 USF Regiment, which are the Marine drone guys organic to 30th Marine Corps. Hola! It turned out they have Malloy T-150 drones. This is an octocopter that looks something like a Ukrainian Vampir/Baba Yaga, but it’s a lot bigger and more powerful; it can move up to 68 kilograms (150 pounds). Costs $400,000, so maybe 50 times more than a Vampir. The mighty Malloy T-150 octodrone, which did some interesting work around Kherson recently (Telegraph newspaper image) According to open sources, the T-150 is mostly used by the US Navy, but, it is also used by the Royal Marines. Britain gave Ukrainian Marines a few of the drones back in 2023, by now, there may have been more. So very reasonable that 426 USF had a T-150 available. For those of you who want to believe it was SAS or USF or Royal Marine Commandos PRETENDING to be Ukrainians, there’s some background for you. But if we are honest, the drone specialists and the people actually fighting the war are the Ukrainians. There is open-source evidence of British volunteers in the 426th Regiment’s ranks. Besides, no matter how entertaining it is to daydream about British special operators blowing up bridges in the Dnipro River lowlands, by 2026, you can bet your children and your house that 426 USF Regiment is the world expert on operating T-150 drones in a war; three years of conventional war combat experience is three years of conventional war combat experience. But since the Telegraph broke the story, I have to suspect somehow the British military was still involved somehow. A rare image of four Ukrainian Mi-8 helicopters in one place (AFU official image, Friday) Anyway, fun speculation aside, what happened next was that every other day, for the next two months, a T-150 carrying a 50-kilogram (110-pound) explosive charge flew from the Ukrainian to the Russian side of the river and then lowered the charge on a wire to a point on the base of the bridge which, thanks to the Russian internet, had been photographed by Russian soldiers and so the Ukrainians could see the best place to pile up explosives next to it. Operators, 3rd SSO Brigade, engage in sneaky-deaky activity, likely Sumy sector (Image by unit, Friday) It appears the Russians were not overly committed to patrolling the bridge. The Ukrainians set up the detonation charge by getting an operator on the ground underneath the bridge, and he (and possibly buddies) rigged the charge. Thirty T-150 sorties later 1.5 tons (!) of explosives had been piled up, rigged, and duly detonated. The bridge emphatically was destroyed, as per the image, allegedly on Tuesday. I’m not clear if the Ukrainians fired a rocket into the explosives or just set it off remotely. The Telegraph reported the T-150 originally was developed originally to herd cattle in Australia. So that’s the story, for what it’s worth. But for sure, the bridge got knocked down. Bridge on the Konka River blows up following the detonation of 1.5 tons of explosives underneath it. (Image is screen grab from video published by Ukraine’s General Staff on Tuesday.) Although President Zelensky has appointed committees and made speeches about how the Ukrainian military brings new soldiers into the ranks (with gross inefficiency and usually grossly impeded by serious corruption), it’s already April, and some facets of the problem aren’t showing improvement. In a piece of very solid journalism, on Monday the platform Ekonmichna Pravda published an article listing the actual, prevailing values of the bribe a Ukrainian man might pay to an official so that he might not be forced to serve in the military; the bribees are the usual suspects like members of the territorial defense committee, directors of companies whose workers get a bye from conscription, army doctors, and so forth. EP reporters went through records of hundreds of court cases on recruitment-related corruption, pulled data on what was going on, and reported it. Try and find that out on your TikTok feed. Here’s the article link. Prior to being registered with a territorial defense committee (more or less, the local draft board): $300-1,500 — removal from the search list $2,500 — update of personal data so that you’re not on the draft register $3,000 — removal from health ministry registration Once the draft board knows about you: $4,000–6,000 — The draft summons gets lost or otherwise fails to find you $5,000 — Once you’re inside the draft office, you remember you forgot your phone in the car, and the guards allow you to leave For men very serious about not getting drafted: Up to $20,000 — registration as not subject to conscription for questionable reasons $25,000–50,000 — registration as not subject to conscription for fictitious $16,000–18,000 - The Military Commissariat will be inclined to see your existing physical ailment as disqualifying $25,000 — Full medical disability, which also qualifies you for government assistance for your disability $10,000–12,000 — Permission to leave Ukraine’s territory, even though the law says you can’t $9,000 — “Lifetime” deregistration from conscription lists, i.e., in addition to what you paid to not get drafted the first time out As to scale, in 2025, in the Dnipro region, local draft board members were found guilty of accepting $300,000 in bribes from draft evaders. The latest news is that the government intends to do away with the draft committees and replace them with things called “recruitment offices” with new staff. It would be good if it happens. Voltaire was right. First time a tragedy, second time a farce. You can’t make this stuff up. It’s like if they put you in charge of a big country, and you start eating stupid pills. US President Donald Trump, April 6, 2026: “We are obliterating their country. And I hate to do it but we are obliterating. And they just don’t want to say ‘Uncle.’ They don’t want to cry, as the expression goes, ‘Uncle.’ But they will, and if they don’t, they will have no bridges, they’ll have no power plants, they’ll have no anything. I won’t go further because there are other things that are worse than those two.” Russian President Vladimir Putin, Feb. 24, 2022: “I call on the servicemen of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to prevent bloodshed, immediately lay down their arms, and go home. [...] All servicemen of the Ukrainian army who comply with this call will be able to leave the combat zone without hindrance and return to their families…[but] I want to emphasize that all responsibility for the possible bloodshed will lie fully and wholly with the ruling Ukrainian regime.” Russian real estate sales, unsold homes relative to total market by region (Image from Friday, source in watermark) - Ministry of Education announces that a university student joining the Russian army quit later because he has a legal right to return to his studies, the reason being that the state thinks military service is more important. - Belgorod Oblast announces pension and other social payments won’t be paid to people living in border regions because no money. - Federation Council announces banking system will “borrow” personal savings of citizens to make emergency reports of oil ports of Ust-Luga, Primorsk, and Novorossiysk, but no worries it will be paid back with interest. The term is “temporary redirection” of a deposit. - First time ever, air raid sirens in Kazan Last week I reported that the Russian news feeds were saying the May 9 “Victory” parade in the Red Square was cancelled. This week, the Russian Z-blogger Ilya Tumanov, a/k/a FighterBomber, reported that no, the ground part of the parade is still on, it’s just the air force part that won’t be flown, this because “the threat from [Ukrainian] ballistics or cruise missiles is growing.” He went on to say [this was on Russian TV] that he had talked to people and maybe the ground portion would be modified or redirected, and the soldiers would march someplace safe, without an audience but for television cameras. Meanwhile, on Tuesday, Putin’s press secretary announced nothing had changed, Russia is mighty, and planning for the Victory Day parade is proceeding normally. So now you are as updated as the Russian citizenry. Dagestan, Monday Reprinted from Kyiv Post’s Special Military Correspondent Stefan Korshak’s blog. You can read his blog here. The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post. Stefan Korshak is the Kyiv Post Senior Defense Correspondent. He is from Houston Texas, is a Yalie and since the mid-1990s has worked as correspondent/photographer for newswire, newspapers, television and radio. He has reported from five wars but most enjoys doing articles on wildlife and nature. You can read his weekly blog on the Russo-Ukraine War on Facebook, Substack and Medium. His new book on the 2022 Siege of Mariupol is available on Amazon UK and Amazon US .