Bigger Geopolitical Take Outs from Iran War

The author argues Trump’s war with Iran ultimately strengthened Tehran, exposed limits of US power, destabilized Gulf alliances, and accelerated geopolitical shifts favoring China, Türkiye, and Ukraine. Ash contends Washington may eventually accept a new Iran nuclear deal after failing to achieve regime change or decisive military victory. Make us preferred on Google Flip Share Facebook X (Twitter) LinkedIn Bluesky Email Copy Copied US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine speaks as a map of the Strait of Hormuz is displayed during a press briefing at the Pentagon in Washington, DC, on April 16, 2026. SAUL LOEB / AFP Content Share Facebook X (Twitter) LinkedIn Bluesky Email Copy Copied Flip Make us preferred on Google Trump’s war on Iran increasingly looks set to end in the US significantly rolling over to Iranian demands, and, eventually some JCPOA like agreement. Follow our coverage of the war on the @Kyivpost_official . Since its creation the Islamic Republic has searched for a deterrent against attack from the US. It had thought it had this with its nuclear program and its proxies. However, having a nuclear program without actually moving to a bomb proved to be the worst of both worlds - it failed to serve as a deterrent, instead getting it attacked first in the 12-day war in 2025 and then again in Gulf War III. And its proxies similarly proved to be little deterrent, as long as Iran did not want to risk going to war in their defense. Israel and the 12-day war significantly reined in Iran’s proxies. In the end in launching Gulf War III, and making the war existential from the outset, by taking out the Supreme Leader, and talking about the desire for regime change, Trump left Iran little choice but to escalate by attacking nearby Gulf states and closing the Straits. In forcing Iran to react for its own survival, Trump gifted Iran the deterrent it thought it originally had in nukes and proxies. But the real deterrent has proved to be its ability to strike Gulf economies with drones and missiles and to close the straits, thereby impacting the global economy by disrupting global supply chains and then global markets. The close proximity of Gulf states, their diversification strategies to make them lynchpin to global supply chains, including but beyond oil, and the changing nature of warfare with the rise of drones, and the difficulty in defending against such threats, gifted Iran newfound leverage. Other Topics of Interest Russian Strikes on US Companies in Ukraine Raise Targeting Concerns Russian strikes have hit facilities linked to major US companies in Ukraine, including Cargill, Coca-Cola, Boeing, Mondelez, Philip Morris, Bunge and Flex Ltd., according to the New York Times. Company representatives and business leaders have raised concerns with US officials that the attacks may be deliberate, while Washington has avoided publicly condemning the strikes disclosed by Ukraine this year. Iran wants a deal - it cannot last out the Straits blockade and tightened sanctions forever, but it assumes it can last longer than Trump’s stomach for pain to the global economy and higher prices to US consumers at the gas pumps. And especially with midterms looming for the GOP. So Iran wants to impart enough pain on Trump, as the deterrent so as he will never risk an attack on Iran again - and will ensure that Israel is also held at bay by the US. Iran is still looking to reach the US choke point, and that comes by holding down the Straits as long as possible. So Iran will continue to wage a longer game, stringing out negotiations, and demanding also a high price in terms of sanctions relief and economic assistance. In the short-term Trump’s intervention has strengthened the Islamic Republic. Hard liners in the IRGC have faced off against the might of the US, and Israel, and survived, and that is a win for the Islamic Republic, or that is how the hardliners see it.  The question is, can this victory hold off the obvious popular demands for real political change in the country? Likely for some time more yet, and the sanctions relief and economic assistance will provide some relief. And if that fails the regime will respond to any opposition with further brutal crackdowns. The sad reality though is that if Trump, and Israel had left the Islamic Republic to its own endeavors, economic failure would likely have brought change much sooner than has Trump’s war. Sadly, Trump’s war has likely extended the duration of the Islamic Republic. If the Islamic Republic has been strengthened, what broader conclusions can be drawn from the war in terms of the impact on other geopolitical players? First, the U.S, and, as of writing, it looks as though this is yet another war in the Middle East that the U.S. has lost - following prior recent defeats in Iraq and Afghanistan. I guess it also could fall into the long list of wars lost by great powers against supposedly weaker adversaries: the US and France in Vietnam and the Indo-Suez, the USSR in Afghanistan, perhaps on-going Russia in Ukraine. A lesson here is don’t get involved in wars you cannot win. Maybe one there for China on Taiwan. For the US though the war has shown the limitations of US power. Therein after the successful 12-day war against Iran, the decapitation effort in Venezuela, the U.S. had appeared to have a huge technological superiority globally, appearing as the apex power, even perhaps over China. But this war has shown the difficulty of waging a war without clearly defined goals, with poor planning, no exit strategy, and without listening to or involving allies. It also shows the limitations of US aerial and sea power, and that it is difficult to engineer regime change without being willing to commit boots on the ground. That was a political constraint imposed by past prior failed wars - Iraq, Afghanistan, et al. They say arrogance comes before a fall, and that perhaps should be the lasting lesson for the US in this conflict. One hopes that Trump will have learned his lesson from this defeat and he will be more guarded in pulling the trigger next time around. Depending though on what drove him to such a disastrous misadventure in Iran, and the extraordinary decision apparently to ignore decades long advice in respect to attacking Iran, he might well still want to change the news cycle, or try and buoy his poll ratings before midterms, by similar high risk, but potentially damaging adventures - Greenland, or trying still to force a bad peace on Ukraine with Russia. It is hard to imagine the Gulf being the same after this war. The Gulf’s rapid development over the past several decades has been built on diversification strategies - the Visions - from oil but funded from oil. Their success was built though on security. This security was built on the assumption of a U.S. security umbrella, huge investment in their own defense and engagement with Iran. All three policies failed. The US seemed to put its interests, or those of Donald Trump and Israel, above those of allies in Europe and the Gulf. When it came to the supply of Patriot missiles to the region, Israel came first. And by going for an all-out attack on Iran and making it existential it forced extreme retaliation from Iran against Gulf states. The whole business model of the Gulf states is now at risk - but less so for states, like Saudi Arabia and Oman which have more export options outside the Straits. And reflective of these differing export options, we have seen splits and divisions opening up across and between Gulf states. The UAE, Bahrain and Kuwait have perhaps most to lose from the closing or tolling of the Straits by Iran. No surprise then that they have appeared to adopt the most hawkish stance on the war.  UAE, in particular, has seemed to message that while it did not want this war, if the U.S. and Israel have started it, they need to finish it by once and for all taking out the security threat from Iran. UAE appears perplexed, even angry that other Gulf states failed to come to its defense, and that the UAE suffered the most drone and missile attacks from Iran of any state in the region. And the UAE seems incensed that some of its erstwhile Gulf and regional allies have sought to seek to negotiate or deal with Iran. This part explains I think the preemptive UAE decision to exit OPEC. The message is that if we cannot rely on our Gulf allies then we should act in our own interests - and in OPEC that means not agreeing to production cuts but pumping at full pelt and maximizing short term income streams to invest in defense and diversification. UAE has also concluded that if the Gulf states, even the U.S., cannot defend it and ensure security, key to its diversification drive, then it needs to ally with the one regional state that perhaps can - Israel. This is an extraordinary move, given feelings in the Muslim world around Gaza, Lebanon et al. But again, the UAE view is that needs must and it must act in its own interests, and ensuring security is existential to its whole business model, hence the willingness to ally now with Israel. Kuwait and Bahrain - similar in some respects to UAE, albeit somewhat constrained by their own strategic ties to KSA. Notable that Bahrain also views the Iran risks as existential given its majority Shia population, a Sunni monarchy, and a history of Shia unrest, particularly from 2011, ended eventually with Saudi intervention. Notable then that Bahrain led efforts to secure UN Security Council backing for a resolution supporting the use of force to reopen the Straits - eventually vetoed by China. Saudi Arabia - has been in a better position than UAE, Bahrain and Kuwait, given that it has alternative export routes from the Straits. As with other Gulf states, KSA has been taken aback by the inability of the US to deliver on its strategic alliance with the Gulf states and defend them from attack from Iran. Further, in attacking Iran, against Gulf states’ interests, Riyadh has I think finally understood that U.S. interests do not align with those of KSA and the Gulf states. KSA has thus pursued a twin track approach of first looking to mediate a deal with Iran, while also looking to secure alternative defensive alliances to help cover the shortfall left by the U.S. These latter efforts have seen a deepening in defensive ties with Egypt, Pakistan and Türkiye. On the economy front, KSA has indicated a desire to further diversify trade routes, with one plan to build transport and pipelines from KSA, north thru Syria, Jordan and Türkiye to markets in Europe. This perhaps explains KSA’s increasingly anchor role in peace and stability efforts in Syria, but also the rapid normalization in relations with Türkiye, after the hugely damaging Khashoggi affair. KSA, and MBS certainly now see themselves as leaders in the Gulf and the Sunni Islamic world.  How the STEP (Saudi, Türkiye, Egypt, and Pakistan) partnership develops will partly depend on how far these other states accept Saudi leadership and hegemony perhaps, and its desire to use defense tech development as a driver for its own economic diversification strategy. Will Türkiye, for example, be prepared to deliver defense technology exchange with KSA, for example, for financial support? What is evident from the above though is that we are now seeing the formation of two clear groupings of Muslim states, one led by UAE, perhaps including Kuwait and Bahrain, seeing the Iran war as a reason to move closer to Israel, and the other led by Saudi Arabia, including the likes of Türkiye, Egypt, Pakistan and Qatar, seeking alliances with similar minded Muslim states. Given long running tensions and rivalries between KSA and UAE, seen in Yemen, but also Syria, Somalia, Sudan and Libya, the question is all this shaping up for some longer-term clash. The likes of Türkiye, Egypt, Pakistan, et al, feel uncomfortable by this newfound schism, and certainly do not like being caught having to choose sides between the regional leaders, in UAE and KSA, but it feels like with the Iran war we might be approaching that point. Obviously, some would argue that that just plays into the hands of Israel and Iran, seeing Sunni states divided. Israel - After the 12-day war, and having prior ravaged Hamas and Hezbollah, Israel had appeared as the regional hegemon with a huge technological and military superiority. The failed Iran war has though perhaps shown the true limitations of US, and Israeli power. But in particular, in the case of Israel, the perception of the country as constantly waging wars across its borders has seen it lose the global public opinion war, which could prove to be very damaging going forward. For example, whereas in the past US opinion was typically two thirds to a third in favor of Israel over the Palestinian cause, that has now reversed and this could well endanger future US, and Western military and financial support for Israel. As with Trump, Israel, may well have overextended itself in this war with Iran, and could pay the price for that over the longer term. Pakistan - generally accepted to have played a blinder in offering Trump and Iran it’s good offices to broker peace. Trump has got himself in a fix, and Pakistan is trying to offer him ways out. This comes after the genius move by Pakistan to offer to nominate Trump for the Nobel peace prize in brokering peace in the recent India - Pakistan war, albeit it’s hard to understand what Trump really did there. PM Shahbad, and Field Marshall Munir just appear adept at massaging Trump’s ego to the advantage of Pakistan. This likely will yield favorable treatment on tariffs - it already has - and likely financing. But Pakistan has also been quick to leverage its nuclear arsenal to tighten the relationship with Saudi Arabia, signing a strategic defense relationship there, joining the STEP partnership and quickly dispatching Pakistan air force jets and other assets in KSA’s defense against Iran. This will deliver Pakistan much needed financial support from KSA, and likely Qatar. There has though been a price to be paid from the deepening ties with KSA, which has been a worsening in relations with UAE, which has pulled key swap lines and announced that is pulling visas for Pakistani guest workers in UAE. The latter will risk key remittance flows, but any shortfall is likely to be made up by KSA, as it has by covering part of the $3.5 billion in lost swap lines from KSA. Türkiye - in the short term the Iran war has made macro management more difficult for Mehmet Simsek. Türkiye is a huge energy importer - with an annual energy import bill of around $50 billion, 3-4% of GDP. And the rough calculation is that each $10 increase in the oil price adds $3-5 billion onto an already rising current account deficit, while adding 1.1% to inflation. And on the latter one, the CBRT is already struggling to bring sticky inflation down - not helped now by the reluctance of the central bank to hike rates. So likely oil at $100 a barrel for an extended period of time will boost the current account deficit to over $50 billion and add 3-4% to inflation, which is already stuck at over 30%. This suggests risks for a weaker lira and potentially higher inflation and policy rates, meaning lower real GDP growth as elections are approaching. Set against that though the Iran war, alongside the war in Ukraine, has just reaffirmed Turkiye’s geopolitical and defense tech importance to the U.S., Europe and the Gulf states. All security roads tend to lead to Türkiye. Hence Turkey’s membership in the STEP organization will likely bring valuable funding from KSA, Qatar and other Gulf states. Even UAE, which is likely unhappy about Türkiye’s depending ties with KSA, is still eager to tap into Türkiye’s defense tech capability, hence the recent call between Erdogan and MBZ, and the visit of Sheikh Mansour bin Zahed Al Nayan to Istanbul also this week. Meanwhile, the war in Iran has just helped crystallize the understanding in Europe of the lynchpin importance of Türkiye to European defense, via its hard power military prowess and defense tech capabilities in drones et al. So there we have seen a host of European states lock in strategic defense agreements with Türkiye, including the U.K., Belgium, Spain and Italy. All this likely will bring much needed financing to alleviate the higher external financing needs as a result of higher oil prices, and also perhaps a new trading relationship with Europe, in a Customs Union plus. Meanwhile, US - Türkiye relations are the best they have been in decades, with Türkiye offering the US solutions in Syria, et al. Trade, financing and investment should ensue. Russia/Ukraine : The initial take had been that the war in Iran had given new impetus to Russia to sustain the war in Ukraine as higher short term oil prices provided a much-needed boost to the Russian economy. This came as sanctions were finally beginning to weigh on the Russian economy in late 2025 and early 2026. The assumption also was that scarce US munitions would be diverted to the Gulf, with fewer available to defend Ukraine. The reality is, I think, somewhat different. In sowing disunity in the Gulf, and seeing UAE leave OPEC, the concern in Moscow is that all this will see the collapse in coordination by oil producers and lower long term oil prices. Added to demand destruction, this could lead to oil prices a year or so out much lower than pre-Iran war levels - imagine here $50 a barrel. If the prior one third oil price discount on Urals returns the prospect of $30-40 oil prices would be catastrophic for the Russian economy. So I sense here that the war in Iran has created a sense of dread, not optimism in Russia, and this comes with increasing complaints about the state of the Russian economy - recession, high inflation, high policy rates, and low investment. By contrast, there seems to be a new optimism in Ukraine as their drone technology capabilities have been further showcased in the defense of the Gulf states against Iran, and this has seen new strategic defense agreements signed with Gulf states, helping further isolate Russia. Indeed, Gulf states I think have been annoyed over Russian support for Iran, and this is likely to be seen in reduced willingness on the part of Gulf states to facilitate financial transactions with Russia. This will further tighten the noose around the Russian economy. Meanwhile, the fact that the US has been pushing its interests in waging war in the Gulf, at the cost of higher global energy prices, has encouraged Ukraine to do the same. Ukraine has hence taken the gloves off in its attacks on Russian longer range energy infrastructure. This has seen Ukraine unchained, and confident. And Ukraine’s newfound defense tech capability, showcased in the Gulf has just reinforced the view to Europe that its defense is now dependent on Ukraine. And the whole debate about NATO membership for Ukraine is redundant, the debate now is how we tie/integrate Ukraine into European defense. Ukraine now adds more to Europe’s defense than the other way around. Ukraine is more an asset to Europe, than the other way around. The lack of confidence in Russia was seen last week in the low-key Victory Day celebrations which signaled that the war has finally come home to Russia and Putin is worried about his own personal security more than anything. It says a lot that Russia, a supposed great power, is unable to defend its leaders in Central Moscow. Perhaps here also that after the US strike to kill Ali Khamenie, that Putin is now longer sure that the US can hold back Ukraine against a similar leadership decapitation operation. In summary, Ukraine looks like it is now winning the war, and Russia losing, and this might well force Russia into serious peace negotiations. Europe? On the one level Europe is a loser from the Iran war through higher energy import costs, higher inflation and likely lower growth. On the other Trump’s war on Iran has just cemented the view that Europe can no longer rely on the US, and it must develop its own autonomous defense capability. This means there is no choice but to invest more in its own defense, and to try and revamp the European economy to aid its own defense, but also to deepen defense ties with key European allies - Turkiye and Ukraine, but also into the Gulf. China - Trump’s war in Iran has been a gift to China. Yet again the US has got bogged down in a Middle East war it cannot extract itself from, wasting blood, scarce missiles and treasure in the process. As noted above another big conclusion, powers should not get dragged into wars they cannot win. But Trump now needs to be nice to Xi to get him to put pressure on Iran to accept a peace deal with the US. And the war has exposed the limitations of the US military, and their apparent failure to learn very much from the changing nature of warfare revealed in Ukraine. The unwillingness of the US navy to deploy ships in the Straits perhaps reflects what we saw in Ukraine - Ukrainian naval drones beat the Russian Black Sea Fleet> I think China will have learned from this, and naval drones will likely be part of any strategy to push back the US navy in defense of Taiwan. Has this made a Chinese attack on Taiwan more likely? In the end I think the Chinese are not as stupid as the US in terms of getting dragged into a war with an uncertain outcome. That’s still likely the biggest conclusion from Trump’s Iran war failure. Reprinted from the author’s @tashecon blog. See the original here. The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.