Back to the Future

We Ukrainians may win the war, but lose the peace if we select unworthy leaders. Now we have a second chance to rebuild our country on solid ground and not on slogans. Make us preferred on Google Flip Share Facebook X (Twitter) LinkedIn Bluesky Email Copy Copied A national flag of Ukraine flies in front of the landmark Independence Monument in Kyiv on February 24, 2023, on the first anniversary of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. (Photo by Sergei SUPINSKY / AFP) Content Share Facebook X (Twitter) LinkedIn Bluesky Email Copy Copied Flip Make us preferred on Google In a prior Kyiv Post article (“ The Hijacking of a Nation ”), we noted how the first 30-prior years of Ukrainian independence had been “hijacked ” by a self-serving, unprofessional, and corrupt political “elite” that had no goals, no strategy or knowledge of statecraft, and participated in the looting of Ukraine and its riches. All that is now water under the bridge. The end of the war and the onset of reconstruction offer the opportunity to start anew, avoid the pitfalls of the past, and build a state worthy of the Ukrainian people. Ukraine’s future must be rooted in the pan-European civilization from which it sprang and which it helped shape. That civilization is recognized as largely middle class, protective of individual freedoms and civic liberties, governed by those freely chosen by a majority of its citizens, strongly committed to the rule of law and equal treatment under law, protective of private property rights, and a free market economy. Follow our coverage of the war on the @Kyivpost_official . Although European civilization has its flaws and its democracy is frequently unstable, there is none better for Ukraine. The evidence is visible in migration patterns across the globe and in the annual “World Happiness Reports,” showing that 80-90% of countries in the top “happiness” quarter are authentically “democratic.” However, there can be no authentic and lasting democracy without an adequate socio-economic base, a developed political culture, and an affluent middle class encompassing more than 50% of the electorate. Autocratic regimes, such as Russia, claim to be “democracies,” though they simply have the trappings of democracy but lack most of its operative democratic features – “hamburgers” but without the meat. Other Topics of Interest Poland ‘Setting Direction for Europe’ With Historic €43.7 Billion EU Defense Loan Poland has signed a landmark €43.7 billion agreement under the EU’s SAFE defense program, a move Prime Minister Donald Tusk says positions Warsaw as the leader in “setting the direction for Europe.” The low-interest loan, equivalent to 180 billion zloty, will be used for rapid military procurement and to stimulate the domestic defense industry amid ongoing security threats from Russia. In addition to a robust and stable middle class, democracies must have three branches of government (each independent of the others and with clearly delineated separate powers); at least two major competing parties with differing ideologies but common democratic values; the rights of the parliamentary opposition protected by law; local self-government (i.e., domestic public service functions transferred to the lowest practicable level of governance); a professional and non-partisan protected class of career civil servants; rule of law and equal treatment under such law; and the transparency and accessibility of public authorities. Over the last four years of war, Ukrainians have demonstrated that they will never submit to an alien autocratic civilization such as Russia’s “Russkiy Mir,” and have twice gathered by the hundreds of thousands in mass “Maidan” demonstrations to take back their nation from hijackers. Hence, one of their top post-bellum priorities must be the reform and enhancement of democratic governance by “declaring war” on corruption and applying the savings and recovered assets to building state power in support of the economy and as a deterrent against Ukraine’s enemies. The key components of state power include a nation’s hard power – its economy, military, and diplomacy – and the “soft” power of informational statecraft. The economy is the one source that enables all the others. The shock created by the war and the weaknesses it revealed opened the door to rethinking past mistakes and restoring confidence in a new government that truly supports its citizens rather than hobbles them with taxes and corruption. Ukrainians will want new leadership, sweeping government reform, and the rapid restoration of normal life. Civic organizations and the media, backed by the government, must take the lead in requiring that all candidates for public office complete standard questionnaires listing education, experience, and accomplishments and accounting for their time during the war. This, plus even-handed media coverage of candidates, can greatly improve the quality and integrity of Ukraine’s new political elite. After the election of a new president and parliament, and after the cleaning and demining of the nation are underway, Ukraine will need a recovery strategy that jump-starts its industrial and production capabilities, expands its agricultural potential, and rapidly rebuilds and grows its economic base. Although Ukraine already has a growing, profitable industry supplying the world with weapons and drone-related expertise, it must also revive, strengthen, and expand the numerous non-military industries it once had while adding new ones. Of particular importance is the revival of its aerospace, rocket manufacturing, and other “heavy” industries, especially machine tool fabrication. Its government must no longer stand aside or collaborate with a private enterprise in the extraction, sale, and export of rare minerals or agricultural output in their raw forms, but should provide incentives for the production, fabrication, refinement, and marketing of a final, end-use product. Every additional stage in the process means good-paying jobs, training in a variety of skills, and more taxable profits for both the owner and the state. We must work towards the day when every new loan repayment – rather than borrowing – is celebrated. This last point regarding the use made of Ukraine’s rare mineral and fossil deposits is especially relevant. These are national, not private, assets. The state must control its extraction and disposition. As an example, the extraction and sale of titanium, in its raw form, can be very profitable to the “owner” of such deposits, but its real value lies in its use and the diplomatic and commercial leverage it provides the nation. These assets are as much a national security priority as Ukraine’s power-producing facilities and gas reserves, and cannot be regarded as simply private property. The lack of a “transformation strategy” and balanced state regulation in the early 1990s cost Ukraine dearly, as the political “elites” who gained power were more interested in self-enrichment and the retention of power under the cover of slogans such as “liberalization,” “globalization,” and “decommunization.” Even after 12 years of open aggression and a long war, programs for sectoral development and modernization of critical industries and infrastructure to guarantee Ukraine’s security and defense have not yet been developed. While foreigners eagerly recruited Ukraine’s best rocket, cyber, and software experts, and rummaged – as if in a “fire sale” – through its vast stock of still-useable military materiel, Ukraine relied on its charitable diaspora to furnish adequate tourniquets for its wounded. We are now living at the cusp of a transformational period and a “new” Ukraine. We will have learned from the errors of the past and will have to fix much that has been neglected, in error, or in disrepair, while entrusting stewardship to Ukraine’s best and brightest. In strengthening democracy and our economy, we must encourage the growth of a middle-class majority, support small and medium-sized businesses and independent farmers, and limit the political influence of oligarchs. We must have “zero” tolerance for corruption Both our civilians and soldiers have suffered and sacrificed greatly, and almost all who have stayed in Ukraine these last four years now have (as Americans like to say) “skin in the game.” They cannot and will not return to the past except when it sheds light on a much brighter future. This is the second of a 3-part series in which we review past errors, suggest essential corrections, and turn our attention to building a “New Ukraine.” The views expressed are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post Col. Gen. Smeshko’s academic credentials include a PhD in Technical Sciences and System Analyses, and a Master’s of Law. After his first appointment as Ukraine’s Defense Attaché to the United States, he held a variety of top-tier academic and leadership positions in governmental national security, law enforcement, and technical science agencies and committees, including that of Chairman of Ukraine’s Joint Intelligence Committee, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine, Chairman of Ukraine’s Security Service, and Acting Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council. Smeshko is the author of “Essays on the History of Ukraine.” He founded the “Center for Strategic Studies and Analysis,” and ran as the presidential candidate from the Conservative-Democratic “Strength and Honor” party.